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ARTICLES

LEGAL ISSUES AFFECTING LOCAL GOVERNMENTS IN
IMPLEMENTING THE CHESAPEAKE BAY
PRESERVATION ACT*
W. Todd Benson**
Philip 0. Garland***
I.

INTRODUCTION

A profound chapter in Virginia land use law has begun. The
Chesapeake Bay Preservation Act ("CBPA"),1 passed in 1988, asks
localities to look beyond their geographic boundaries and beyond
the health and well-being of their citizens, and to exercise their
police and zoning powers to protect the quality of state waters. Localities also are asked to cooperate with a new state agency violating the sanctum of the local government land use prerogative.
The authors believe the principal legal issues raised by the
CBPA will revolve around the exercise of power. The issues will
emerge as the CBPA highlights conflicts between localities and the
following actors: the Chesapeake Bay Local Assistance Board
("CBLAB"), federal and state governments, and private
landowners.
A fundamental issue is the extent of the authority conveyed to
* This paper was originally presented at the 1989 Annual Meeting of the Virginia State
Bar. Section VI(A) is adopted from an outline by W. Todd Benson prepared for the
Committee on Continuing Legal Education of the Virginia Law Foundation and published
in 1988 in "Essentials of Environmental Law for the Virginia Lawyer: A Functional
Approach."
** Assistant County Attorney, Henrico County, Virginia; former Chairman of the Environmental Law Section of the Virginia State Bar; A.B., 1976, Princeton University; J.D.,
1982, T.C. Williams School of Law, University of Richmond.
*** B.S., 1983, James Madison University; Candidate for J.D., May 1990, T.C. Williams
School of Law, University of Richmond.
1. VA. CODE: ANN. §§ 10.1-2100 to -2115 (Repl. Vol. 1989).

UNIVERSITY

OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 24:1

the CBLAB through the CBPA. This includes the extent to which
the CBLAB has authority to promulgate regulations binding on
localities.
The intergovernmental relationship is more complex. The players (and quite likely the courts) must determine the extent to
which local zoning and subdivision ordinances will be binding upon
the state and federal governments. The Coastal Zone Management
Act 2 ("CZMA") specifically places upon the federal government
obligations to act in a manner consistent with state initiatives;3 the
CBPA is such a state initiative,4 albeit one delegated largely to the
localities.' Similarly, the CBPA requires state agencies to "exercise
their authorities under the Constitution and laws of Virginia in a
manner consistent with the provisions of comprehensive plans,
zoning ordinances, and subdivision ordinances that comply with
[the act]. '"6 At issue, consequently, will be the extent to which
these two "higher" governmental authorities must comply as landowners with local requirements. A related concern is the potential
for conflicts between the regulatory programs. For example, what
should happen when a wetland proposal satisfies federal requirements for discharge of dredged or fill material into navigable waters,7 but does not satisfy more strict zoning requirements? Is the
zoning preempted or must the applicant comply with both?
Finally, localities will have to exercise their new zoning authority
in a manner consistent with traditional protections afforded to in2. Pub. L. No. 92-583, 86 Stat. 1280 (1922) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-64
(1988)). The act "affirm[s] a national interest in the effective protection and careful development of the coastal zone by providing assistance and encouragement to coastal states...
to voluntarily develop and implement management programs for their coastal areas." NATIONAL OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA COASTAL

RESOURCES

MANAGEMENT

PROGRAM

AND

DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL

IMPACT

7 (1985). Participation in the program is voluntary. "Governor Baliles signed
Executive Order Thirteen (86) formally establishing the state program on June 23, 1986."
STATEMENT

COUNCIL ON THE ENV'T, VIRGINIA'S ENVIRONMENT

40 (1987). Federal approval of Virginia's

participation was given in September, 1986. Id.
3. See 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c) (1982).
4. The Virginia coastal zone management program is known as the Virginia Coastal Resource Management program. The CBPA is not yet a designated program; it is assumed that
it soon will be.
5. As discussed in Section IV of this article, the Chesapeake Bay Local Assistance Department apparently feels that the purpose of the CBPA is to create a state agency to regulate
local government. The authors believe that this is incorrect; the CBPA gives local governments authority to protect state waters and calls upon state agencies to provide assistance.
6. VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-2114 (Repl. Vol 1989).
7. Section 404 of the Clean Water Act regulates the discharge of dredged or fill material
into waters of the United States. 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (1982).
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dividual landowners. Not surprisingly, the two principal areas
portending conflict will be the takings protection of the fifth
amendment to the United States Constitution,8 and the vested
rights protections specified in the Code of Virginia.9
These three areas are addressed below. First, however, this article presents a brief overview of the resource at issue and the legislative history of the CBPA.
II.

THE RESOURCE: THE CHESAPEAKE BAY

The beneficial target of the CBPA is the Chesapeake Bay
("Bay"). 10 The Bay is an approximately 200 mile long estuary that
lies within the borders of Maryland and Virginia. However, its
ecosystem is much larger. It "draws water from an enormous
64,000 square mile drainage basin,"1 which includes parts of New
York, Pennsylvania, West Virginia, Maryland, Delaware, and
Virginia. 2
In Virginia, basins of the Potomac, Shenandoah, Rappahannock,
York and James Rivers empty into the Bay.13 These basins, combined with the coastal river basin, constitute a drainage area of
approximately 33,464 square miles and contribute an average daily
flow into the Bay of 16,736 million gallons per day. The population
within Virginia's portion of the drainage basin exceeds 4,061,950.14
Some areas of the basin are expected to show dramatic population
increases over the next thirty years, particularly those areas adja8. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("nor shall private property be taken for public use without just
compensation").
9. See VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-2115 (Repl. Vol. 1989) ("The provisions of this chapter shall
not affect vested rights of any landowner under existing law"); id. § 15.1-492 ("Nothing in
this article shall be construed to authorize the impairment of any vested right ...").
10. The act's remedial purposes are not limited to the Bay. The CBPA expressly authorizes local governments to exercise their police and zoning powers to protect the quality of
state waters without limitation to any connection with the Bay. VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-2108
(Repl. Vol. 1989). In addition, the CBPA states that "[a]ny local government, although not a
part of Tidewater Virginia . . .may incorporate protection of the quality of state waters
into their comprehensive plans, zoning ordinances and subdivision ordinances ... " Id. §
10.1-2110.
11. U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, CHESAPEAKE BAY: INTRODUCTION TO AN ECOSYSTEM 7

(1987).
12. Id. at 4.
13. VIRGINIA WATER RESOURCES RESEARCH CENTER, VIRGINIA'S WATERS 3-14 (1986).

14. The drainage and population figures are the authors' calculations, based on figures
found in Virginia's Waters. See id.
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cent to tidal waters.1 5
The CBPA recognizes that "[h]ealthy state and local economies
and a healthy Chesapeake Bay are integrally related."'1 6 This bold
statement is well justified. 7 However, the capacity of the Bay to
function as a "protein factory" is not without limit. By the mid
1970s, the Bay showed clear signs of stress. The Environmental
Protection Agency ("EPA") conducted a seven-year study to determine the cause of its decline. "[Tihe study results confirmed the
hypothesis: the condition of the Bay was deteriorating due to point
and nonpoint sources of pollution."'" Among other things, the 1983
EPA report documented "disturbing trends,"' 9 including excess
nutrients in the water,2 0 decline of submerged aquatic vegetation, 2 '
15. See THE YEAR 2020 PANEL, POPULATION GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE CHESA2020, at 25-29 (1988).
16. VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-2100 (Repl. Vol. 1989).
17. Today, the Chesapeake Bay is still one of the country's most valuable natural
treasures. Even after centuries of intensive use, the bay remains a highly productive
natural resource. It provides millions of pounds of seafood, functions as a major hub
for shipping and commerce, supplies a huge natural habitat for wildlife, and offers a
wide variety of recreational opportunities for residents and visitors.

PEAKE BAY WATERSHED TO THE YEAR

• . .More than half the total U.S. catch of both soft-shelled clams and blue crabs
comes from the Chesapeake, along with more than a quarter of the nation's total
yearly oyster catch. A thriving fin-fish industry, primarily based on menhaden and
rockfish, rounds out the Chesapeake's major commercial seafood production. The
value of the Bay's fishing catch exceeds $100 million annually.
Baltimore's sage, H.L. Mencken, once called the Bay, "a great big outdoor protein
factory." A recent study . . . ranks the Chesapeake as third in the nation in overall
fishery catch. The Bay's production is exceeded only by the Atlantic and Pacific
Oceans. That's an impressive ranking, since the Bay covers a much smaller geographic area than the other major U.S. fishing centers.
U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, supra note 11, at 3.
18. VIRGINIA COUNCIL ON THE ENV'T, PROGRESS REPORT OF VIRGINIA'S CHESAPEAKE BAY

PROGRAM 1 (1987).

19. Id. at 2.
20. Excess Nutrients. Primarily phosphorus and nitrogen, these nutrients can foster the
growth of aquatic plants such as algae when present in large quantities. When these
blooms die off and decompose they reduce the dissolved oxygen which is critical to
the survival of living resources in the Bay's waters. Excess nutrients are coming from
a combination of agricultural, forestry, and urban runoff, and municipal and industrial plant discharges. Since 1950, phosphorus and nitrogen entering Virginia's
tributaries to the Chesapeake Bay have increased 44% and 87% respectively. If no
additional nutrient controls are implemented, these loadings will increase by another
36% and 23% by the year 2000 due to projected population increases.
Id.
21. Decline of Submerged Aquatic Vegetation. Submerged aquatic vegetation (SAV) has
all but disappeared in the Chesapeake Bay and its tributaries since the late 1960s.
SAV provides fish and crabs essential habitat and protection from predators, buffers
wave energy, and produces much needed oxygen for the living resources of the Bay.
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and excess toxics in specific areas of the Bay.2 2 The following year,
Governor Robb's Commission on Virginia's Future concluded that
"[f]or some time, the'23unwitting destruction of the Chesapeake Bay
has been underway.
The realization that this valuable Virginia resource is at risk was
the driving force behind the adoption of the CBPA.
III.
A.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE ACT

Governor Robb's Commission on Virginia's Future

The legislative history of the CBPA can be traced to Governor
Robb's Commission on Virginia's Future. The Commission's Task
Force on the Environment and Natural Resources ("Task Force")
opined that "existing legislation, institutions, and land management practices are not adequate"2' 4 for the purpose of dealing with
"the new demographic and economic forces that, being of regional
and statewide scope, require regional and statewide leadership and
authority to protect and serve the citizens of the Commonwealth. '25 The Task Force cited several reasons for the failures.
First, it noted that "localities have been thwarted by court decisions that strike down attempts to extend their zoning powers to
new situations. '2 6 Indeed, early Supreme Court of Virginia decisions have made clear that the prerogative to act on behalf of the
The decline of these grass beds is attributed to excess nutrients, turbidity, and
sedimentation.
Id.
22. "Excess Toxics. Large quantities of toxic substances have been found in specific areas
of the Bay primarily around urban and highly industrialized areas. Toxics contaminate waters, sediment, and living resources, and have the potential to affect humans as they accumulate in the food chain." Id.
23. GOVERNOR'S COMM'N ON VIRGINIA'S FUTURE, TOWARD A NEW DOMINION: CHOICES FOR
VIRGINIANS 27 (1984) (Final Report Vol.).
24. GOVERNOR'S COMM'N ON VIRGINIA FUTURE, TOWARD A NEW DOMINION: CHOICES FOR
VIRGINIANS 34 (1984) (Task Force Reports Vol.).
25. Id. at 34.
26. Id. at 35. Virginia is a Dillon's Rule state. In short, a locality can only exercise those
powers expressly granted and any uncertainty as to the exercise of power is strictly construed against the locality. See Mardikes, Cone & Van Horn, Government Leasing: A Fifty
State Survey of Legislation and Case Law, 18 THE URB. LAW. 1, 6 n.7 (1986) (citing DILLON,
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 55 (lst ed. 1872)). Virginia continues to adhere to Dillon's Rule.
See, e.g., Tabler v. Board of Supervisors, 221 Va. 200, 202, 269 S.E.2d 358, 359 (1980); Commonwealth v. County Board, 217 Va. 558, 573, 232 S.E.2d 30, 40 (1977); see also Board of
Supervisors v. Horne, 216 Va. 113, 117, 215 S.E.2d 453, 455 (1975) (county board's powers
limited to those expressly, or by necessary implication, authorized by state law).
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environment is reserved to the General Assembly.
The leading case on this point is Old Dominion Land Co. v.
County of Warwick.17 This case presented the question of the validity of two ordinances enacted by the Board of Supervisors of
Warwick County. The ordinances prohibited the Old Dominion
Land Company from connecting several of its recently constructed
residences with a sewer line owned by the company and emptying
raw or untreated sewerage into the adjacent tidal waters of the
James River. As authority for these ordinances, the county relied
upon the predecessor to section 15.1-51028 of the Code of Virginia
("Code") as well as its authority to establish and maintain public
sewers and watermains. Conversely, Old Dominion maintained that
since the acts complained of do not constitute a nuisance and were
not injurious to the health of the community, the county board of
supervisors has no power or authority to pass laws prohibiting an
owner of property, bordering on tidal waters, from emptying its sewage into such waters, but that the control of such matters is exclusively within the authority of the General Assembly.29
In holding that the locality had no authority to regulate pollution of water, per se, the court stated:
Clearly ... [section 15.1-510 of the Code has] no application to the

present case, since, under the agreed statement of facts, the act of
the company in draining its sewage into the river is not a nuisance,
27. 172 Va. 160, 200 S.E. 619 (1939).
28. The Code of Virginia provides:
Any county may adopt such measures as it may deem expedient to secure and promote the health, safety and general welfare of the inhabitants of such county, not
inconsistent with the general laws of this Commonwealth. Such power shall include,
but shall not be limited to, the adoption of quarantine regulations affecting both persons and animals, the adoption of necessary regulations to prevent the spread of contagious diseases among persons or animals and the adoption of regulations for the
prevention of the pollution of water in the county whereby it is rendered dangerous
to the health or lives of persons residing in the county.
VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-510 (Repl. Vol. 1989) (emphasis added). Note that the prevention of
water pollution is limited to situations in which the pollution is dangerous to the health or
lives of persons residing in the county. This limitation has created two significant deterrents
to localities protecting the Bay. First, it establishes a water quality standard. The history of
the federal Clean Water Act demonstrates that water quality standards as the first line of
protection are doomed to failure. Second, as demonstrated in Old Dominion Land Co., localities could not consider downstream pollution but were confined to the immediate health of
their own citizens.
29. Old Dominion Land Co., 172 Va. at 165, 200 S.E. at 620.
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nor is there any evidence that it in any way endangers the health of
the inhabitants of Warwick County."
Thus, a wall emerged separating public health from environmental health. Provided a locality could establish a nuisance or health
threat to its citizens, it could legislate against water pollution. It
was without authority to legislate, however, with an eye toward
protecting the Bay.
Similarly, in Commonwealth v. City of Newport News,3' the Supreme Court of Virginia held that neither the executive nor the
judicial branches of the state have authority to regulate pollution
on their own initiative. In this case, the Attorney General filed an
action alleging that Newport News was discharging raw, untreated
sewage in considerable volume into the Hampton Roads. The Attorney General claimed the discharge was illegal, because it rendered shellfish and fish taken from the area unfit for human consumption, effectively destroying the right of fishery in those
waters.3 2 The Commonwealth argued that it held its tidal waters
and lands as a trustee for the benefit of the public, "to be administered as a trust for the enjoyment by them of their public rights
therein, and subject to certain rights of users thereof which are
common to all the people of the State." 33 The Commonwealth
claimed it had no right or power to authorize tidal waters and
lands to be used for any purpose or in any manner "which will
substantially impair, or in effect destroy, the common
right of all
'' s4
its people to use them for these [public] purposes.
The Supreme Court of Virginia rejected this argument, stating:
The legislature, of course, owed to the people of the State a most
solemn duty to administer the jus privatum of the State and to exercise its jus publicum for the benefit of the people; but, except as is
otherwise expressly or impliedly provided by the Constitution, what
is for the benefit of the people is committed to its discretion free
from the control or dictation of the executive or judicial department
30. Id. at 167, 200 S.E. at 621; see Tabler v. Board of Supervisors, 221 Va. 200, 204, 269
S.E.2d 358, 361 (1980) ("the legislature did not intend to grant local governing bodies the
power to regulate or prohibit the sale or use of disposable containers").
31. 158 Va. 521, 164 S.E. 689 (1932).
32. Id. at 531, 164 S.E. at 691.
33. Id. at 532, 164 S.E. at 691.
34. Id.
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5

Thus, it is clear that environmental protection is an issue expressly controlled by the General Assembly. All authority for protecting the environment is derived therefrom. To the extent it is
perceived that local governments are part of the problem and
therefore must be part of the solution, Governor Robb's Task
Force was correct in identifying the shortcomings of Virginia law.
Heretofore, localities have not had the authority to legislate to protect the environment per se.3s
The second area of concern which the Task Force noted was localities' inability to work together. In this regard, the Task Force
cited the following:
In the case of Bull Run, for example, the Northern Virginia Regional Park Authority bought land along the Fairfax County bank of
the stream for watershed protection and public enjoyment. But
Prince William County, which chose not to join the regional author37
ity, allowed development to the water's edge on the other bank.
35. Id. at 549, 164 S.E. at 697.
36. Although Governor Robb's Commission on Virginia's Future found localities thwarted
in attempts at innovative zoning, it may be argued that localities were thwarted generally.
From 1955 until 1981, localities generally lost zoning cases presented to the Supreme
Court of Virginia. Indeed, a review of these cases led two law professors to conclude that
"the preeminent criterion of the validity of a zoning action is whether that action is consistent with the land use preferences of the individual developer." L. BEVIER & D. BRION,
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF LOCAL

LAND USE

DECISIONS

IN VIRGINIA

105 (1981) (Inst. of Gov't, Univ.

of Va.). BeVier & Brion also concluded that the opinions "reveal a strong judicial intolerance for the erosion of the land developer's constitutionally protected private rights by the
exercise of the zoning power." Id. at 108. BeVier and Brion are not alone in their assessment. See, e.g., Foote, Planningand Zoning in Virginia, in HANDBOOK FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENT ATTORNEYS 305, 306 (R. Rosenberg ed. Supp. 1988) ("The implementation of effective
land use controls in Virginia has been most problematic. Localities have been constrained
by a legal and political climate that was antithetical to local regulation not only of land use
decisions, but of community life generally."); W. Tayloe Murphy, Jr., Development and the
Environment in the Old Dominion: Where Should We Go?, 64 INST. OF GOV'T 14 (1987)
("the problem has been compounded by the fact that, until recently, the Virginia Supreme
Court has rather regularly interpreted local zoning authority to be limited generally to the
matter of approving the 'highest and best use'. .. ).
37. GOVERNOR'S COMM'N ON VIRGINIA'S FUTURE, supra note 24, at 35. The Task Force also
cited the absence of local land use controls to protect Smith Mountain Lake. Id. Such
problems, in part, are a direct result of the problem immediately discussed above. Historically, localities have had no authority to protect the environment per se; their authority has
been limited to protecting the health and well-being of their citizens. Thus, local zoning
initiatives taken to protect regional or state resources outside of their jurisdictions were
illegal and void. Although the Task Force may have mourned Prince William County's failure to protect the stream, unless their citizens directly were affected by any resulting deteri-
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Finally, the Task Force noted that "[1] ocalities are confronted with
technical or economic problems that they do not have the competence or resources to deal with.""8
To remedy such limitations, the Task Force made several recommendations. The most significant for purposes of this article are
recommendations 1 and 3:
1. To deal with the increasing pressures on land-to protect it and
use it wisely for the long term benefit of all Virginians-the Commonwealth should take a more positive leadership role ....
3. Local government should be empowered and encouraged to deal
innovatively and responsively with complex land use problems. The
General Assembly should review the series of Supreme Court decisions striking down attempts by local governments to extend their
zoning powers to cover new situations and determine whether those
extensions should be authorized by law."
The recommendations included an important caveat. The Task
Force clearly stated that dramatic shifts in the balance of power
between the Commonwealth and the localities were not necessary. 40 This caveat was in keeping with general legislative consensus. Four years earlier, the General Assembly had defeated a measure to participate in the Federal Coastal Zone Management
program. "Opposition . . . centered primarily on the concept of

' 41
the 1000' coastal strip under special [state] management rules."
In short, the General Assembly believed that land use was to remain a local prerogative although additional authority and guidance were needed. The Task Force report echoed this belief.

B.

Chesapeake Bay Land Use Roundtable Report

The next major piece of the CBPA's legislative history is the
Chesapeake Bay Land Use Roundtable Report 42 ("Roundtable Reoration in water quality, Prince William County was without authority to prevent the criticized development.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 36-37.
40. See id. at 28-29.
41. COUNCIL ON THE ENV'T, supra note 2, at 39.
42. CHESAPEAKE BAY LAND USE ROUNDTABLE, LAND
GINIA: THE NEXT STEP IN PROTECTING THE BAY (1987).

USE INIATIVES FOR TIDEWATER VIR-
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port"). In 1986, the General Assembly appropriated funds to support the formation of the Chesapeake Bay Land Use Roundtable
("Roundtable"). The Roundtable was to find ways to address the
relationship between land use issues and the health of the Bay.43
The significance of this report in analyzing the CBPA cannot be
overstated. First, the principal architect of the CBPA, Delegate
Tayloe Murphy, Jr., was a member of the Roundtable; he was committed to drafting legislation which implemented the Roundtable
recommendations. Many elements of the Roundtable Report are
contained in the CBPA.
The Roundtable Report contained five principles which guided
the Roundtable's deliberations. The first three principles are germane to the issue of delegation of powers in the CBPA,4 4 with
Principle 1 serving as "a foundation for the recommendations that
followed. ' 45 Principle 1 stated that "Virginia's response to issues
related to land use and the Bay should flow from an analysis and
understanding of Virginia's laws, institutions, historical context,
and natural setting. ' 46 The Roundtable agreed not to "simply
adopt approaches used in other states,''47 but "to craft a response
rooted in Virginia's experience. 4 8s This explanatory language is important when viewed in historical context. Only several years
before, Maryland had enacted "critical areas" legislation to address water quality problems of the Bay. 49 However, the Maryland
legislation created a strong central agency to regulate local land
use from Annapolis. It also declared all land within 1,000 feet of
43. Id. at 1.
44. Principles 4 and 5 are not directly related to the power sharing issue under the CBPA.
Principle 4 provides that "Itlensions between public responsibilities to protect natural resources and the environment and private interests in property are inevitable; they must be
dealt with as fairly and equitably as possible." Principle 5 espouses the view that "[h]ealthy
state and local economies and a healthy Chesapeake Bay are integrally related; economic
development and resource protection are not and cannot afford to be seen as mutually exclusive." Id. at 8.
45. Id. at 7.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. See Chesapeake Bay Critical Area Protection Program, MD. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. §§
8-1801 to -1816 (Cum. Supp. 1989). As recently noted by Governor Schaefer of Maryland,
"We have strict development guidelines. In Maryland, we passed . . . the first law. It was
the critical area restriction which said that within 1,000 feet of the bay, there were restrictions on development." Effectiveness of Programs for the Protection of the Chesapeake
Bay, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Environmental Protectionof the Committee on
Environment and Public Works, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1988).
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use from Annapolis. It also declared all land within 1,000 feet of
wetlands and tidal waters as critical areas,5" an approach clearly
rejected by the Virginia General Assembly in the recent past. 51
Thus, the Roundtable's caveat suggested a repudiation of the Maryland response. This repudiation was further suggested by Principles 2 and 3.52

The Roundtable Report then announced a series of "essential elements" for a program "designed to preserve local autonomy and
flexibility while guaranteeing protection of the water quality,
shorelands, tributaries, and habitats of the Chesapeake Bay."53 All
of these "essential elements" found themselves in the initial drafts
of the CBPA, although not all remained.54
After enunciating the "essential elements," the Roundtable Report went on to articulate a policy the Roundtable believed should
be established by the Commonwealth. The second paragraph of
this policy coupled with Principle 5 eventually became subsection
A of the "preamble" to the CBPA.55
The Roundtable Report finally recommended that the state
identify minimum standards and requirements consistent with Virginia's Coastal Resources Management Program. The Roundtable
advised that state standards govern at least the shorelands along
tributaries in the Bay, wetlands, coastal sand dunes, and barrier
islands. 56 As part of this, the Roundtable recommended a mechanism for state review "to ensure consistency with all appropriate
state requirements.' 57 It suggested a new citizen's board be cre-

ated, with authority "to approve local plans and ordinances once
consistency with state policy and standards is achieved." 58 These
final recommendations were, of course, inconsistent with Principles
50. MD.NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 8-1807 (Cum. Supp. 1989); see also supra note 49.
51. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
52. -Principle #2: Local government should retain primary responsibility for local land
use decisions whenever possible and should be granted the powers necessary to execute that
responsibility at the local level.
Principle #3: The state should play a strong leadership role in the protection of public lands, critical resources, and environmental quality. The State would have to work
closely with local governments to assure that state policies and goals are met.
CHESAPEAKE BAY LAND USE ROUNDTABLE, supra note 42, at 7.

53.
54.
55.

Id. at 9.
Compare id. at 9-10 with VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-2100 to -2110 (Repl. Vol. 1989).
See VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-2100(A) (Repl. Vol. 1989).

56.

CHESAPEAKE BAY LAND USE ROUNDTABLE, supra note 42, at 12.

57.

Id. at 14 (emphasis added).

58. Id.

12
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ginia's Future, and the reasons for the 1979 defeat of coastal zone
management participation.5" It is submitted and discussed below
that the Roundtable's recommendation for a strong state agency
with authority to approve land use decisions was the single most
significant recommendation not adopted by the General Assembly.
C.

Chesapeake Bay PreservationAct

Work on drafting the CBPA began even before the Roundtable
Report was released. On November 20, 1987 a first draft had been
prepared by Jeter M. Watson 0 in consultation with Delegate Murphy. The draft legislation was entitled "The Land and Water Plan-

ning and Protection Act." Section I of the first draft contained verbatim the policy statement recommended by the Roundtable. Like
the Roundtable Report, this draft was aggressive vis-a-vis the new
citizen board's proposed authority.6 1 Similarly, local governments
59. This incongruous recommendation apparently resulted from the Roundtable's myopic
view of the Bay's problems. In its "findings" the Roundtable placed responsibility for the
demise of the Bay on the localities. This "finding" is now being used by the Chesapeake Bay
Local Assistance Department to justify its actions under the CBPA. See CHESAPEAKE BAY
LoCAL ASSISTANCE DEP'T BRIEFING PAPER SERIES, No. 89-01, PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT OF
WATERSHED APPROACH TO DESIGNATION OF CHESAPEAKE BAY PRESERVATION AREAS AS PRO-

POSED BY THE VIRGINIA INSTITUTE OF MARINE SCIENCE 4 (1989).
The Roundtable's conclusion that localities are the prime culprits is not consistent with
the conclusions of other organizations studying the Bay. Moreover, it completely ignores
limitations on local governments under Dillon's Rule and relevant case law. Heretofore, it
would have been illegal for localities to zone to protect the Bay. Any criticism of localities
for acting within the law is therefore unjustified.
60. At that time, Mr. Watson was the staff attorney for the Virginia office of the Chesapeake Bay Foundation, a private, public interest organization dedicated to Chesapeake Bay
issues. Mr. Watson is now the Executive Director of the Chesapeake Bay Local Assistance
Department, the administrative agency created by the CBPA. While drafting the CBPA,
Mr. Watson frequently consulted with land use lawyers representing divergent interests including one of this article's authors, W. Todd Benson.
61. The draft authorized the new board to:
1. Exercise general supervision and control over the coordination of land use and development and water quality protection activities at the various levels of local, regional, and state government within the Commonwealth.
4. Develop and keep current land use criteria and standards for water quality
protection.
8. Approve, disapprove, require modifications, and recertify local government comprehensive plans, zoning ordinances, subdivision ordinances, special use permit criteria in accordance with the criteria, standards, policy and goals of this Act.
11. Make separate orders and regulations it deems necessary to implement the criteria, standards, policies, and goals of this Act.
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were directed to use board criteria to determine the extent of the
shoreline area within their jurisdiction subject to board approval.
Furthermore, local governments were advised that comprehensive
plans and zoning would be "subject to review and approval" by the
board for compliance with the CBPA 2
By December 22, 1987, the draft was styled "The Shoreland
Planning and Protection Act." The overall provisions remained the
same, including the philosophy relative to the citizen board's
authority.
By January 10, Secretary Daniel" had reviewed the draft legislation, and changed the name of the intended act to "The Chesapeake Bay Preservation Act."64 Similarly, the new board envisioned by the draft was changed to the "Chesapeake Bay Local
Assistance Board"6 5 ("Board" or "CBLAB"). After a few minor adjustments, the January 10, 1988 version of the CBPA was formally
introduced as House and Senate bills.
The mood was ripe for passage but localities still had significant
concerns. Dominant among the concerns was any legislation implementing "zoning from Richmond."
Representatives for the localities pressed Delegate Murphy and
Secretary Daniel to remove all language granting the Board authority to approve local land use decisions, or establish binding
standards. In return, localities would support the legislation. An
agreement was reached, and the following day, Secretary Daniel
proposed the necessary amendments to the House Committee on
the Chesapeake Bay and its Tributaries.6 The requested amendments were made. Section 10.1-2102(D)67 was amended, deleting
reference to the Board's authority to "approve local government

13. To abate land use and development practices that violate the standards or are
inconsistent with the criteria, standards, policies, or goals of this Act or hazards and
nuisances dangerous to public health, safety, or the environment, both emergency and
otherwise, created by the improper use and development.
Draft of CBPA (Nov. 20, 1987).
62. Id.
63. John Daniel, II, is Virginia's Secretary of Natural Resources.
64. Draft of CBPA (Jan. 10, 1988).
65. Id.
66. Interview with C. Flippo Hicks, lobbyist for the Virginia Association of Counties (Feb.
10, 1989) [hereinafter Interview] directly involved with the compromises made prior to passage of the CBPA.
67. For the reader's convenience, reference is made to sections of the codified CBPA
rather than to the section designations used in the bills.

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 24:1

programs." Section 10.1-2103 was amended, deleting reference to
the Board's authority to "[m]ake separate orders and regulations
deemed necessary to implement the provisions of this Act." Also
deleted were the requirements in section 10.1-2109 for local governments to have their comprehensive plans, zoning, subdivisions,
and Chesapeake Bay Preservation Areas reviewed or approved by
the Board. With one exception, all of these changes were made in
the House committee and are now present in the CBPA's
The localities intended to limit the Board's enforcement authority to a formal review and comment; absent agreement between the
Board and locality, the Board's follow-up authority was envisioned
as limited to instituting a declaratory judgment proceeding against
the locality, upon the vote of five of its members.6 9 Because the
Virginia Administrative Process Act had a hearing process similar
to the one requested, the language of section 10.1-2103(8)o was
71
agreed upon.
When the bill emerged from the House Committee on the Chesapeake Bay and its Tributaries, it was discovered that section 10.12103 had not been corrected pursuant to the agreement reached
between Delegate Murphy, Secretary Daniel, and the localities. 2
The CBPA still contained language authorizing the Board to approve, disapprove, alter, or amend those elements of local government comprehensive plans and zoning ordinances for compliance
with the CBPA.73 Secretary Daniel again was pressed and once
again, he submitted the necessary amendments on behalf of the
administration.7 4 The House Rules Committee made the changes
requested. 5
By early February, 1988, the board envisioned by the proposed
legislation was indeed a local assistance board. It had regulatory
authority to promulgate criteria "to assist counties, cities and
towns in regulating the use and development of land . . . and to
68. Interview, supra note 66.
69. Id.
70. "[The Board is authorized to] [e]nsure that local government comprehensive plans,
zoning ordinances and subdivision ordinances are in accordance with the provisions of this
chapter. Determination of compliance shall be in accordance with the provisions of the Administrative Process Act." VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-2103(8) (Repl. Vol. 1989).
71. Interview, supra note 66.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
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determine the ecological and geographic extent of the Chesapeake
Bay Preservation Areas. '7 6 Gone from the legislation were the
broad references to "standards" contained in earlier drafts, reference to the CBLAB's authority to promulgate general "orders and
standards," references to the CBLAB's authority to "approve, disapprove, and require modifications" of local land use actions, and
the requirements that localities submit land use initiatives for "review and compliance." With the compromises made, the CBPA
was passed, and signed into law in March, 1988.
IV.

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LOCALITIES AND THE BOARD

The first issue that localities must confront is the CBLAB's authority to promulgate regulations binding upon the localities. The
CBLAB is sharply limited in its authority, which extends only to:
(1) promulgating criteria which can assist and guide the localities
in making land use decisions consistent with the CBPA; and (2)
standing to institute litigation if a particular locality fails to exercise its land use authority in a manner consistent with the CBPA.
Basic land use authority, however, remains with the localities. The
basis for these conclusions is set forth below.
The "purpose and policies" section of the CBPA provides an excellent overview of the entire act. 7 The first sentence in subsection
A articulates the public purpose behind the act-the integral relationship between a healthy economy and a healthy Chesapeake
Bay. Subsection A continues by setting forth four major principles.
The first two are addressed to the localities:
(i) the counties, cities and towns of Tidewater Virginia [shall] incorporate general water quality protection measures into their compre76. VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-2107 (Repl. Vol. 1989). This result was consistent with Governor
Robb's Commission on Virginia's Future calling for "a more positive leadership role" by the
state with the caveat that "a call for a concentration of power in the agencies of our state
government is not required." See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
77. In order for localities' ordinances under the CBPA to be valid, they must promote the
goals expressed in the preamble. Note that two common means of determining legislative
intent are not applicable in this dispute. The first is that the legislation should be liberally
construed to accomplish its remedial effect. This method is inapplicable because the dispute
is not between the regulated and the regulator - but between two claimants to the throne.
Both the localities and the Board believe they are the governmental unit given primacy for
controlling nonpoint source pollution. Therefore, examining the CBPA's remedial purpose
does nothing to resolve this conflict. Similarly, the common tool of looking to the lead
agency for its interpretation of the CBPA also is inapplicable when it is unclear which
agency is the lead agency.
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hensive plans, zoning ordinances, and subdivision measures or ordinances; (ii) the counties, cities, and towns of Tidewater Virginia
[shall] establish programs, in accordance with criteria established by
the Commonwealth, that define and protect certain lands, hereinafter called Chesapeake Bay Preservation Areas, which if improperly
developed may result in substantial damage to the water quality of
the Chesapeake Bay and its tributaries.7"
The remaining two principles are addressed to the Commonwealth:
(iii) the Commonwealth [shall] make its resources available to local
governing bodies by providing financial and technical assistance,
policy guidance, and oversight when requested or otherwise required
to carry out and enforce the provisions of this chapter; and (iv) all
agencies of the Commonwealth [shall] exercise their delegated authority in a manner consistent with water quality protection provisions of local [ordinances]. 9
The "purpose and policies" section also addresses the relationship between the localities and the CBLAB. First, principle (ii) establishes that the localities-not the CBLAB-are to establish
programs that define and protect certain lands. To the extent the
CBLAB is involved at all, this principle provides that localities are
to implement their programs "inaccordance with criteria" established by the CBLAB.
"In accordance" does not require lock-step compliance. Rather,
the phrase contemplates more flexibility.8 ° Furthermore, localities
are charged with acting in accordance with criteria, not standards."' "Criteria" contemplate "[a] standard of judging; a rule or
78. VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-2100 (Cum. Supp. 1988).
79. Id.
701 P.2d 1293, 1295
80. See, e.g., Love v. Board of County Comm'rs, 108 Idaho 728, -,
(1985):
"[I]n accordance" does not mean that a zoning ordinance must be exactly as the
Comprehensive Plan shows it to be. Rather, the question of whether a zoning ordinance is "in accordance" with the Comprehensive Plan is a question of fact. Thus, a
governing body charged to zone "in accordance" with its comprehensive plan ...
must make a factual inquiry to determine whether the requested zoning ordinance or
amendment reflects the goals of, and takes into account those factors in, the comprehensive plan in light of the latter present factual circumstances surrounding the
request.
Id.
81. This distinction was made as early as the November 20, 1987 draft of the CBPA
wherein "criteria" and "standards" were separately defined.
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test, by which facts, principles, opinions, and conduct are tried in
forming a correct judgment respecting them.""2 The import of this
language is clear enough. The Board is charged with developing
"standards for judging" or "facts and principles" which the localities can then adopt to improve their comprehensive plans, zoning
ordinances, and subdivision ordinances in order to accomplish the
goals of the CBPA. Thus, for example, the Board may develop criteria which indicate that nonpoint source pollutant X must be reduced by fifty percent, but it is for the localities to determine
which land use tools are appropriate to achieve such a standard.
This interpretation of principle (ii) is reinforced by principle
(iii). Here, the role of the Commonwealth is described as providing
assistance, guidance, and oversight. Nowhere is it envisioned that
the Board will draft regulations imposing substantive requirements, timetables, and zoning procedures. If this point is not made
abundantly clear in subsection A, then subsection B, which gives
localities "the initiative for planning and for implementing" the
CBPA's provisions, 3 can leave no doubt.
82. WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 627 (2d ed. 1954). The distinction was
clearly on the minds of localities when they lobbied for and succeeded in having the references to standards replaced with references to criteria. See supra notes 65-68 and accompanying text.
83. VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-2100(B) (Cum. Supp. 1988). The "preamble" was a significant
departure from the Roundtable Report. The Roundtable Report specifically provided for
localities to exercise their land use authorities "compatible with state regulation and policy
and [in a way] that ensures the proper discharge of the public trust responsibilities of the
Commonwealth."

CHESAPEAKE BAY LAND USE ROUNDTABLE,

supra note 42, at 11 (emphasis

added). However, reference to both state regulations and public trust responsibilities were
deleted from the "preamble."
In an unpublished opinion dated June 27, 1989, the Attorney General's office came to the
same conclusion as the authors.
In other words, the Board's criteria should dictate the ultimate result to be reached,
but the localities, working within the Board's guidelines, should be free to adopt
whatever reasonable measures are necessary to comply with the criteria. For example,
the Board may set as a goal or standard the removal or reduction of runoff with
potentially harmful or toxic substances entering the Bay equivalent to that provided
by a 100 foot buffer area, and the locality must determine the best way to achieve the
result.
Read together, all of these provisions [of the Act] appear to evince an intent to
allow localities flexibility in determining the best methods to comply with the criteria
and standards set by the Board. If the legislation meant that the Board was to set
both the goals and the specific methods by which to reach those goals, then the
above-sited provisions would be unnecessary and, in fact, contradictory. There would
be no need, for example, to state that the local governments were to establish programs in accordance with the criteria, nor that they had the initiative for planning
and implementing the Act and that the Commonwealth was to act primarily in a
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The sections of the CBPA which define the powers and duties of
the two principal players also envision the localities as the lead
party. Sections 10.1-2108 and 10.1-2110 of the Code authorize localities to exercise their police and zoning powers to protect the
quality of state waters "consistent with" the provisions of the
CBPA. In a regulatory setting, exercising authority "consistent
with" enabling legislation does not envision any lock-step conformity. "It means instead, 'in harmony with,' 'compatible with,' 'holding to the same principles,' or 'in general agreement with.' -4
A worthwhile comparison is that between language granting authority to the CBLAB and language employed by boards intended
to have regulatory authority. The CBLAB is directed "to assist [localities] . . .[by promulgating] regulations which establish criteria

for use by local governments.""a In contrast, the State Board of
Health is directed "to promulgate and enforce such regulations
and provide for reasonable variances and exemptions therefrom as
may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this title ...."I'
The contrast is sharp and obvious. The CBLAB does not have a
roving commission to do good works throughout Tidewater Virginia. Instead, it is principally a support agency, a local assistance
board.
Any interpretation of the CBPA for a strong state agency with
traditional regulatory authority is inconsistent with the CBPA's
language and the legislative history of its passage.87 Yet, the
supportive role. Similarly, the criteria are for use by local governments and are there
to "assist" them in regulating the use and development of land in protecting the
quality of state waters. If the Board were to regulate not only the goals, but also the
methods by which to reach those goals, then the Board would be providing much
more than assistance, and, for all intents and purposes, there would be nothing left
for local governments to determine or use since they would simply have a laundry list
of mandated rules.
Attorney General Letter Opinion to Jeter M. Watson and James C. Wheat, Jr. at 6-7 (June
27, 1989) (unpublished) (signed by Deputy Attorneys General R. Claine Guthrie and Stephen D. Rosenthal).
84. Roanoke Memorial Hosp. v. Kenley, 3 Va. App. 599, 606, 352 S.E.2d 525, 529 (1987).
85. VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-2107 (Cum. Supp. 1988).
86. VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-12 (Repl. Vol. 1985).
87. Proponents of the CBPA have repeatedly bolstered it by declaring it Virginia's unique
response to a Virginia problem. Board Chairman Wheat stressed this point at the February,
1989 meeting of the Board. The uniqueness comes from its being "[a] cooperative state-local
program." W. Murphy, Jr., The Chesapeake Bay Preservation Act: A Step Toward the Public Trust Doctrine, presented to the 15th Annual National Specialty Conference, Water Resources Planning Division, American Society of Civil Engineers (June 1-3, 1988). However,
as envisioned by the Board, it is anything but a cooperative state-local problem. Rather, a
master-slave relationship is created by the Board in the proposed regulations. Indeed, Dele-

1989]

CHESAPEAKE BAY PRESERVATION ACT

CBLAB has already started to assume power which it was never
delegated by the General Assembly. In January 1989, the Chesapeake Bay Local Assistance Department circulated draft "criteria"
for discussion purposes.88 These "criteria" were essentially draft
regulations requiring specific standards to be complied with by the
localities. Little substance was left to local discretion. All pretext
of a state-local cooperative program was abandoned as the CBLAB
set out to regulate local land use decisions.
A selective review of the draft regulations circulated in January,
1988 by the Chesapeake Bay Local Assistance Department highlights the Board's overreaching.
Section II.1.B stated:
Goals of program. A program shall consist of those elements
which are necessary or appropriate to:
1. Minimize adverse impacts on the quality of state waters and
aquatic habitat from nonpoint source pollutants that run off from
surrounding lands;
2. Establish land use practices for development in and adjacent to
Chesapeake Bay Preservation Areas that will accommodate growth
and prevent significant degradation of state waters, consistent with
the criteria in these regulations;
3. Provide for the improvement of water quality in the redevelopment of currently intensely-developed lands. 9
This section purported to establish the goals of the program. However, section 10.1-2100 of the Code establishes program goals and
grants primary authority for program development to localities."0
Accordingly, the language in the January draft regulations was inappropriate. A more useful approach would have been for the
gate Murphy contends that "the Chesapeake Bay Local Assistance Board ... is vested with
powers and duties generally consistent with other state boards." Id. If this is true then the
unique Virginia solution of a cooperative state-local program disappears. Quite the contrary,
the authors believe that the Board was given carefully limited authority to assist localities in
their compliance with the CBPA. Legislative compromise created a unique Virginia response, inconsistent with a strong state agency "zoning from Richmond."
88. CHESAPEAKE BAY LocAL AsSISTANcE DEP'T. BRIEFING PAPER SERIEs No. 89-01, CRITERIA
DISCUSSION DOCUMENT (Feb. 1989). [hereinafter January Draft Regulations]. Actually two

different documents were circulated by the Department in January, the second one with the
February 1989 date. Discussed herein is the latter document.
89. Id.
90. VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-2100(A) (Repl. Vol. 1989).
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Board to suggest recommended plan elements, supplemented with
milestones for determining progress.
Language in the January draft regulations appeared to exempt
from local zoning requirements those developers who otherwise
could receive a permit from a state or federal authority. 9' Section
10.1-2113 of the Code, however, merely states that the authority
granted in the CBPA is supplemental to other state and local authority.9 2 It does not suggest exemptions. Moreover, section 10.12114 of the Code requires state agencies to exercise their authority
consistent with the CBPA. 93 Thus, section 10.1-2113 does not give
other agencies grandfathered supremacy over the CBPA as the
January draft regulations suggest. Rather, in the event of a conflict
(e.g., a subaqueous bed permit is appropriate but local zoning precludes the activity) some manner of accommodation would have to
be made between the developer and the locality (e.g., variance) or
the activity will be unlawful. The CBLAB has the authority to
grant a variance from the requirements of the act in certain circumstances.9 4 The "requirements" of the CBPA will be manifested
in local comprehensive plans, local zoning ordinances, and local
subdivision ordinances. Variances are controlled by the requirements of sections 15.1-430 and 15.1-494 through 15.1-497 of the
Code. A variance issued by the CBLAB would be in direct violation of these sections.
Section V.1.A.1. of the January draft regulations required each
local government to "submit to the Department a tentative work
plan for accomplishing [implementation of its] . . . program." Subsequent provisions were to the same effect: "Within 60 days . . .
the Department. . .shall either approve the proposed program or
91. In accordance with Code of Virginia Section 10.1-2113, the regulatory authorities of
other state, regional, and local regulatory agencies in Chesapeake Bay Preservation
Areas shall not be affected in any way by the requirements of these regulations.
Except as otherwise allowed in accordance with the section above, the following
management criteria shall be used in accordance with the procedures outlined in the
following sections of these regulations.
January Draft Regulations, supra note 88, at § IV, 1 1.
92. VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-2113 (Repl. Vol. 1989).
93. Id. § 10.1-2114.
94. The Board may grant a variance from the requirements of these regulations if: (i)
strict application of the criteria will result in undue hardship unique to the particular
situation of the applicant by denying all reasonable economic use of the property as a
whole, and (ii) granting the variance will not result in a violation of water quality
standards.
January Draft Regulations, supra note 88, at § IV, 9.
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notify the local government of specific changes that must be made
. . 1)95 As previously discussed, authority for the CBLAB to "review and approve" local initiatives was expressly and emphatically
deleted from the original bill. 6
The attempt to promulgate regulations in the absence of authority to do so created substantive problems with the draft regulations. For example, instead of providing criteriato guide the localities, in "defin[ing] and protect[ing] certain lands . . . which if
improperly developed may result in substantial damage, '9 7 the
draft regulations simply designated in such areas: "The following
• . .shall be used by the local government as the basis for designation of. . .Chesapeake Bay Preservation Areas: 1. Tidal wetlands
• . . 2. Nontidal wetland. . .3. Tidal shorelines. . . ." This is not
"guidance" because there is nothing for the localities to define.
Rather, this is a zoning decision which usurps local prerogatives.9 8
On May 5, 1987, Chairman Wheat met with representatives of
local governments and listened to their concerns about the proposed regulations published for comment in the Virginia Register.
At the conclusion of the meeting, Mr. Wheat mentioned that if the
current system does not work, the Maryland Critical Areas Program will be imposed. From this, an inference can be made that
Mr. Wheat agrees that the Virginia General Assembly did not go
as far as the Maryland legislature in setting up its act to regulate
nonpoint source pollution. However, the draft regulations then en95. Id. at § V.IC.
96. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
97. VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-2100(A) (Repl. Vol. 1989).
98. By comparison, consider the Report of the Joint Subcommittee Studying The Commonwealth's Tidal Shoreline Erosion Control Policy. This report indicates that numerous
factors must be taken into consideration in order to identify lands which if improperly developed may adversely affect water quality. It strongly suggests that not all shoreline necessarily constitutes "environmentally sensitive zones;" rather, detailed extensive analysis must
be undertaken to make such decisions. See HoUSE DOCUMENT No. 58, app. A, at 1-3 (1989).
This conflicts with the CBLAB declaration that all shoreline is environmentally sensitive
and in need of protection. Such "zoning from Richmond" was clearly rejected by the General Assembly in the past. See supra notes 47-52 and accompanying text. The legislative
history of the act does not support this interpretation.
Guidance by the Board on issues similar to the factors described in the report cited above
is what was contemplated by Virginia Code section 10.1-2107 and expected by the localities.
The January Draft Regulations were substantially lacking in this regard.
The final regulations offer no substantial improvement. See infra notes 100, 210. Compare
Chesapeake Bay Preservation Area Designation and Management Regulations, 6:1 Va. Regs.
Reg. 11, 14 (Oct. 9, 1989) (Resource Protection Areas "shall include: 1.) Tidal wetlands; 2.)
Nontidal wetlands ... 3.) Tidal shores. . .

.")

with quoted portion of draft regulations.
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visioned were equivalent to the Maryland program. This difference
between the legislative intent of the CBPA and the intent of the
draft regulations raises legal concerns over the validity of the proposed regulations.
The hallmark of the Maryland system is the 1,000 foot critical
area. In the proposed draft regulations, the CBLAB assumed the
authority to declare all shoreline as "critical area" and to establish
a 50 foot or a 100 foot buffer, depending upon the circumstances.
This is identical to the Maryland program, except for the difference in the distance.9 9 However, the authority to declare a 50 foot
or 100 foot buffer today may eventually lead to the declaration of a
1,000 foot buffer tomorrow. Indeed, the significant difference between the Maryland and Virginia programs is that lawmakers at
least declared this to be their purpose under the Maryland program. In Virginia, Chairman Wheat and the authors agree that
"zoning from Richmond" was rejected by the General Assembly.
Despite the usurpation of authority by the Board, much improvement is possible while still avoiding this conflict over authority. The Chesapeake Bay Local Assistance Department has articulated the justification for requiring the buffers. For example, the
Board has data which show that a 50 foot buffer will remove X%
of Y pollutant. Presumably, the CBLAB is not interested in a 50
foot buffer per se; it is interested in a reduction of Y pollutant.
Therefore, the Board should make X% reduction of Y pollutant
the standard that localities should achieve, if the CBLAB is to
view their efforts as consistent with the act. The CBLAB should
further promulgate a 50 foot buffer as presumptive evidence that
the standard is met, while leaving the localities the flexibility to
achieve the standard through other land use and police power
methods. In this manner the CBLAB's objectives would be met
and the localities would retain "the initiative for planning and/or
implementing the provisions of the [act]" as mandated in section
10.1-2100(B) of the Code. 100
99. Most readers are familiar with the following story attributed to Winston Churchill.
Presumably, Mr. Churchill asked a woman if she would sleep with him for $1,000,000. She
replied she would. Mr. Churchill then asked if she would sleep with him for $5.00. To this
she responded, "What do you take me for?" He, of course, responded, "Madam, we have
already determined that, we are simply haggling over a price." Similarly, the CBLAB is
simply haggling over the distance.
100. Initially, the CBCAB adopted this approach when it adopted its final regulations in
June 1989. By "allowing" localities to adopt measures which were equivalent in performance
to the CBCAB regulations, the regulation became nothing more than performance stan-
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The language and the legislative history of the CBPA make clear
that the localities have primacy for land use decisions under the
act. The CBLAB, on the other hand, is charged with the responsibility of promulgating criteria to assist localities in delineating
Chesapeake Bay Protection Areas, and providing guidance on how
to protect water quality. The CBLAB was created to assist the localities in fulfilling their responsibilities and does not have authority to dictate how Chesapeake Bay Protection Areas will be delineated or used or how water quality will be protected. It also does
not have authority to dictate the procedures or time tables to be
utilized. However, because the CBLAB does not agree with this
interpretation of its authority, future conflict is likely.
V.

A.

CONFLICTS BETWEEN GOVERNMENTAL PROGRAMS

Effect of the Act Upon Federal Agencies and Actions

Upon implementation of the CBPA, most local governments will
encounter conflicts with federal agencies. Therefore, localities
should anticipate and prepare for federal actions that are inconsistent with their local ordinances. This is particularly true for the
Tidewater governments who have military bases and other federal
government installations within their jurisdictions. 01' To cope with
these situations, localities need to realize the extent of their powers
under the CBPA in relation to the federal government.
The CBPA's relation to the federal government is quickly summarized. The federal government and its agencies are not bound
by state regulation because of the supremacy clause of the United
States Constitution. 2 Nevertheless, Congress may allow federal
dards. The "final regulations" did not become effective because Governor Baliles suspended
the regulatory process for additional comments on this precise issue. In final regulations
published in October, the equivalency provision was debated, making the regulations in conflict with the author's analysis and the Attorney General's analysis. The final regulations are
found at 6:1 Va. Regs. Reg. 11 (Oct. 9, 1989).
101. The total acreage in Tidewater, Virginia was 5,738,380. The federal government
owned 362,356.38 acres in Tidewater, Virginia, which amounts to 6.3% of the land. In some
planning districts, the federal government owned as much as 14.7% of the land. 1 NATIONAL
OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T. OF COMMERCE, COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
COASTAL RESOURCES MANAGEMENT PROGRAM AND FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT

11-6, 11-7 (1986).
102. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (supremacy clause) states:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of
the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every
State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to
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entities to be regulated by subordinate (state and/or local) governments if it specifically and clearly consents to such regulation. At
present, the CBPA will not bind the federal government or its instrumentalities because Congress has not consented to the jurisdiction of the CBPA.
However, the CBPA will likely be incorporated into the Virginia
Coastal Resource Management Program ("VCRMP").' os The Federal Coastal Zone Management Act ("federal CZMA" or "CZMA"),
of which the Virginia program is a part, contains a federal consistency provision wherein Congress specifically has consented to federal compliance "to the maximum extent practicable" with state
programs. Therefore, assuming the CBPA is incorporated into the
VCRMP, the CBPA will be binding on the federal government to
the extent specified under the CZMA's consistency provision. The
following portion of this article will expand on this summary of the
CBPA's relation to the federal government.
Traditionally, the federal government and its instrumentalities
have not been obliged to comply with state or local laws, and are
therefore generally free from state regulation."0 4 Support for this
position derives directly from the supremacy clause of the United
States Constitution. For example, in Johnson v. Maryland,0 5 Maryland required a driver's license of anyone who operated an automobile. Maryland tried to enforce this law upon a federal mail delivery driver. Even though Maryland's law was a valid exercise of
its police powers, the federal government argued that the law interfered with the federal duties being carried out by the unlicensed
driver. 10 6 The Supreme Court agreed and held the law did not apply to federal mail delivery drivers. Similarly, the CBPA and local
ordinances under the CBPA may not be binding on the federal
government.
the Contrary notwithstanding.
See South Carolina v. Baker, 108 S. Ct. 1355 (1988); McCulloch v. Maryland. 17 U.S. (1
Wheat) 316, 427 (1819).
103. Sharon Anderson, from the Virginia Council on the Environment, told one of the
authors that the Council on the Environment plans to have the CBPA incorporated into the
Virginia Coastal Resources Program before the end of 1989 and foresees no opposition from
the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration.
104. See, e.g., Johnson v. Maryland, 254 U.S. 51 (1920) (post office employee not required
to have a state driving license for driving a mail truck); McCulloch, 17 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 316
(federal government immune from state taxation).
105. 254 U.S. 51 (1920).
106. Id. at 53.
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While the federal government reserves the power to make any
necessary rules or regulations respecting property of the United
States, states still retain jurisdiction over federal lands within their
territory and may enforce state criminal and civil laws within those
10 7
lands so long as the state laws do not conflict with federal law.
State law will be preempted (1) if Congress clearly intends to occupy a field; or (2) when Congress does not intend this, the state
law will be preempted "to the extent it actually conflicts with the
federal law" by either making it impossible to comply with both
state and federal law or by interfering with the goals of
Congress. 10 8
In California Coastal Commission v. Granite Rock Co.,10 9 Granite Rock was a privately owned company that ran a mining operation in federally owned lands pursuant to the Mining Act of
1872.11° In 1980, Granite Rock began removing substantial
amounts of limestone in accordance with a plan approved by the
United States Forest Service. 1 The California Coastal Commission informed Granite Rock that it would have to apply for a
coastal development permit to continue mining.112 The Court held
that the commission was not preempted by federal law and was
therefore allowed to impose a permit requirement on Granite
Rock, despite the company's operation in a national forest.'1 3 The
Court noted that the commission did not seek to determine basic
uses of federal land, but to regulate a given mining use so that it is
carried out in a more environmentally sensitive and resource-protective fashion." 4 The Court distinguished between land use planning which was the role of the Forest Service, and environmental
regulation, which was the permissible role of the commission so
long as it did not dictate land uses." 5 Even though the two may
overlap at times, the state law is not preempted if it does not conflict with the federal law.1 16
107. California Coastal Comm'n v. Granite Rock Co., 107 S. Ct. 1419, 1425 (1987) (citing
Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 543 (1976)).
108. Id.
109. 107 S. Ct. 1419 (1987).
110. Id. at 1422.
111. Id. at 1422-23.
112. Id. at 1423.
113. Id. at 1424.
114. Id. at 1428.
115. Id. at 1428-29.
116. Id. at 1429.
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Even when the federal government appears to occupy a field, it
may still be bound by the CBPA under certain circumstances. The
federal government may waive its immunity from state regulation
by consenting to such regulation. 117 Absent specific congressional
authorization, there is a presumption that federal actions are immune from state regulation. 1 8 However, this presumption of immunity only applies to regulations that interfere with the fulfillment of federal law, program or policy. 1 9 Otherwise, state law is
presumptively applicable to federal instrumentalities and enclaves. 20 Consequently, state law enacted prior to federal acquisition of state property will govern so long as it is consistent with
federal policy and remains unaltered by congressional legislation.' 2' This implies that so long as local ordinances under the
CBPA do not interfere with the realization of federal duties or policy then the federal instrumentalities will need to comply with the
ordinances. Unfortunately, the extent of specific federal duties and
policies as well as the extent of interference required to trigger the
supremacy clause are often unclear and extremely relative to the
specific circumstances.
As stated previously, state regulation of the federal government
is possible when there is congressional intent. It is important to
remember that although consent is given, states will have limits on
their regulatory power. The supremacy clause and the commerce
clause' 2 2 create the boundaries for federal consistency with state
regulation. Despite congressional consent to state regulation of federal instrumentalities, such state regulation may not exceed the
117. See EPA v. Water Resources Control Bd., 426 U.S. 200 (1976) (under Clean Water
Act, state NPDES permits not applicable to federal agencies); see also Hancock v. Train,
426 U.S. 167 (1976) (under Clean Air Act, state permits not applicable to federal agencies).
See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6-28 (1978).

118. L. TRIBE, supra note 117, at § 6-28.
119. See, e.g., Sperry v. Florida, 373 U.S. 379, 385 (1963) (Florida law prohibiting
nonlawyers from practicing law is preempted as far as practicing before the Patent Office
which allows nonlawyers to practice before it); Johnson v. Maryland, 254 U.S. 51, 56-57
(1920).
120. L. TRIBE, supra note 117, at § 6-28.
121. See Penn Dairies, Inc. v. Milk Control Comm'n of Pa., 318 U.S. 261 (1943) (milk
dealer contracting with the U.S. Army does not benefit from governmental immunity when
contracting sales within the territorial limits of the state in a place subject to the state's
jurisdiction); cf. Pacific Coast Dairy v. Department of Agric., 318 U.S. 285, 294 (1943) (California price fixing laws do not reach contracts made in territory subject to the exclusive
jurisdiction of the United States).
122. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (commerce clause) (Congress shall have power to regulate commerce among the states).
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amount consented to by Congress, nor may the regulation violate
the commerce clause.
The applicability of the commerce clause to environmental regulations has recently been reviewed in Norfolk Southern Corp. v.
Oberly1 23 where Delaware's Coastal Zone Act ("DCZA") banned
"top-off" service for supercolliers carrying coal in the Delaware
Bay, despite the Delaware Bay having the only naturally protected
anchorage between Maine and Mexico that would accommodate
that type of activity. Norfolk Southern claimed the DCZA ban violated the dormant commerce clause while Delaware claimed the
ban was protected by "congressional consent" via the federal
CZMA. 1 24 The court refused to find congressional consent since it
requires express intent to remove state regulation from the reach
of the commerce clause. 12 5 The court held that "while the F[ederal]
CZMA states a national policy in favor of coastal zone management, it does not ... on its face expand state authority to legislate
in ways that would otherwise be invalid under the Commerce
Clause."'1 28 The court applied a balancing test 127 to conclude that
Delaware's coastal zone program was not immunized from the
commerce clause review by the federal CZMA, nor was it in violation of the commerce clause. 2 '
Hancock v. Train129 is a good illustration of how the supremacy
clause confines state regulation of federal instrumentalities when
there is congressional consent. In Hancock, the Supreme Court decided whether Kentucky, whose federally approved air quality implementation plan had forbidden an air contaminant source to operate without a state permit, could require existing federally owned
and operated facilities to obtain a permit.13 0 Kentucky's program
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

822 F.2d 388 (3d Cir. 1987).
Id. at 392.
Id. at 393-95.
Id. at 394-95.
Three standards of review are applied in performing dormant Commerce Clause
analysis: (1) state actions that purposefully or arbitrarily discriminate against interstate commerce or undermine uniformity in areas of particular federal importance are
given heightened scrutiny; (2) legislation in areas of peculiarly strong state interest is
subject to very deferential review; and (3) the remaining cases are governed by a
balancing rule, under which state law is invalid only if the incidental burden on interstate commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.
Id. at 398-99.
128. Id. at 407.
129. 426 U.S. 167 (1976).
130. Id. at 168.
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was established in accordance with the Clean Air Act ("CAA"),
which required federal instrumentalities to be consistent with state
air quality and emission standards.' However, the CAA had no
specific requirements for federal entities to apply for state
32
permits.1

The Court recognized and accepted that under the CAA, Congress committed federal agencies to comply with Kentucky's air
quality and emission standards, but not Kentucky's permit requirements." 3 The Court noted that under Kentucky's program,
the federal facilities could not operate without a permit even if
they were in compliance with the program's air quality and emission standards.3 Kentucky's regulations were found to have exceeded the congressional consent and were therefore found to be in
135
violation of the supremacy clause.
Hancock reaffirmed the rule that where Congress does not affirmatively and clearly declare its instrumentalities or property
subject to state regulation, the federal function is considered free

of state regulation. 136 Therefore, congressional consent to state regulation or federal activities will only be found where there is "a
clear congressional mandate" that makes the authorization of state
regulation "clear and unambiguous. "137

Accordingly, the CBPA and local ordinances under it may be
able to regulate federal instrumentalities if Congress specifically
and affirmatively consents to the regulation. Such congressional
consent does not now exist for the CBPA. However, incorporation
of the CBPA into the Virginia Coastal Resources Management
Program ("VCRMP") is expected by the autumn of 1989.18 The
VCRMP was established in accordance with the federal Coastal
Zone Management Act. 39 As a part of the VCRMP, the CBPA will
131. Id. at 171-72. Note, the Clean Air Act requires federal compliance while still allowing
the President to exempt certain federal emission sources when paramount national interests
are at stake.
132. Id. at 175.
133. Id. at 177.
134. Id. at 180.
135. Id. at 181.
136. Id. at 179.
137. Id.
138. See supra note 4.
139. 16 U.S.C. § 1451 (1985). The Virginia Coastal Resources Management Program was
approved by the federal government in 1986.
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benefit from the federal consistency provision within the CZMA.' 4"
Therefore, the following portion of this article will review the federal consistency doctrine of the CZMA' 4 ' and its application
through the VCRMP.
The CZMA allows coastal states to operate coastal zone management programs so long as they are approved by the federal government.1 42 The CZMA is not intended to preempt states from exercising their police powers, but rather to encourage states to utilize
their powers.1 43 As an enticement for establishing state coastal
management programs, the CZMA offers federal funding plus the
federal consistency provision, which is a "legally enforceable commitment" requiring federal actions to be as consistent as possible
with approved state programs.'
The consistency provision has
been a very alluring element of the CZMA and easily the most
controversial.
The consistency provision addresses four basic areas of federal
46
action that affect the coastal one.' 4 5 These are federal activities,
federal development projects, 4 7 federal permitting and licensing of
activities that affect the coastal zone, 148 and federal funding and
140. 16 U.S.C. § 1456 (1985). The incorporation of the CBPA into the VCRMP should
make the CBPA a much more effective and useful environmental planning tool for local
governments.
141. This article does not attempt to make a detailed review of the CZMA or its federal
consistency provision. There are numerous articles and treatises published on the subject.
See; e.g., Archer & Bondareff, Implementation of the Federal Consistency Doctrine Lawful and Constitutional:A Response to Whitney, Johnson & Perles,12 HARv. ENVTL.L.
REv. 115 (1988); Eichenberg & Archer, The Federal Consistency Doctrine: Coastal Zone
Management and "New Federalism," 14 ECOLOGY L.Q. 9 (1987); Finnell, Intergovernmental
Relationships in Coastal Land Management, 25 NAT. RESOURCES J. 31 (1985); Hildreth &
Johnson, CZM in California, Oregon, and Washington, 25 NAT. RESOURCES J. 103 (1985);
Schell, Living with the Legacy of the 1970's: Federal/State Coordination in the Coastal
Zones, 14 ENVT'L L. 751 (1984); Wolf, Accommodating Tensions in the Coastal Zone: An

Introduction and Overview, 25

NAT. RESOURCES

J. 7 (1985).

142. 16 U.S.C. § 1451 (1985).
143. See California Coastal Comm'n v. Granite Rock, 107 S. Ct. 1419, 1431 (quoting S.
REP. No. 753, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 20 (1972)); Archer & Bondareff, supra note 141, at 147.
144. Archer & Bondareff, supra note 141, at 117.

145. See 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c), (d) (1982);

NATIONAL OCEANIC

& ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., supra

note 101, at X-1.
146. "The term 'Federal activity' means any function performed by or on behalf of a
federal agency in exercise of its statutory responsibilities." 15 C.F.R. § 930.31(a) (1988).
147. "A Federal development project is a Federal activity involving the planning, construction, modification, or removal of public works, facilities other structures, and the acquisition, utilization, or disposal of land or water resources." Id.
148. "The term 'Federal license or permit' means any authorization, certification, approval, or other form of permission which any Federal agency is empowered to issue to an
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assistance to state and local governments for projects affecting the
coastal one. 149 The consistency standards and procedures vary ac150
cording to the federal action being considered.
Under the CZMA, any federal agency which conducts or supports an activity that "directly affects" the coastal zone is required
to do so in a manner consistent to the "maximum extent practicable" with approved state management programs.' 5' However, the
responsibility of determining whether a federal activity "directly
affects" the coastal zone and whether the activity is consistent to
the "maximum extent practicable rests with the federal
52
government.'
Therefore, the first step of an agency's consistency review involves determining whether the questioned activity "directly affects" a state's coastal zone. This determination is generally based
on the federal agency's judgment unless the state already has listed
the specific activity as one that directly affects the coastal zone
and requires consistency review. 5 1 Unfortunately the term "directly affecting" has not been clearly defined by case law.
In a lengthy opinion, the Court in Secretary of the Interior v.
California5 4 held that the sale of oil and gas leases off the California coast was not an activity "directly affecting" the coastal zone
under the CZMA, thus not triggering consistency review.5 5 "[T]he
sale of a lease grants the lessee the right to conduct only very limited, 'preliminary activities' on the OCS [Outer Continental
Shelf]" and therefore cannot be said to be "directly affecting" the
5
coastal zone. 1
applicant." Id. § 930.51(b). This section of the CZMA also covers the sale of leases for the
exploration, development, and production of Outer Continental Shelf Resources. However,
this particular topic will not be addressed in this article since it is not truly applicable to the
CBPA.
149. "The term 'Federal assistance' means assistance provided under a Federal program
to an applicant agency through grant or contractual arrangements, loans subsidies, guarantees, insurance, or other form of financial aid." Id. § 930.91(a).
150. Archer & Bondareff, supra note 141, at 119.
151. 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(1), (2); NATIONAL OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., supra note
101, at X-2; Archer & Bondareff, supra note 141, at 119.
152. See 15 C.F.R. §§ 930.33(a) to -.34(a) (1988); see also NATIONAL OCEANIC & ATMoSPHERIC ADMIN., supra note 101, at X-2; Archer & Bondareff, supra note 141, at 119.
153. NATIONAL OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIc ADMIN., supra note 101, at X-2.
154. 464 U.S. 312 (1984).
155. Id. at 315.
156. Id. at 342. This is a decision that has drawn considerable criticism from legal scholars and the environmental community. See Reed, Supreme Court Beacher Coastal Zone
Management Act, 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,161 (1984).
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Another controversial issue arising from the CZMA consistency
provision is whether the state programs may regulate activities
outside the coastal zone. The CZMA defines "coastal zone" to in157
clude state land near the shorelines of the several coastal states.
The Supreme Court has held that the phrase "directly affecting"
applied to activities on the federal enclaves within the coastal
zone, but not to Outer Continental Shelf lands which lie outside
the coastal zone. 5 8 The Court recently affirmed this position, declaring that while the CZMA excludes federally owned lands from
the definition of coastal zone, it does not preempt all state regulation of activities on federal lands. 9
In Commonwealth of Puerto Rico v. Muskie, 60 Puerto Rico
challenged the United State Army's plan to change an abandoned
military site into a refugee camp for Cuban and Haitian refugees.
The Army claimed that the CZMA did not apply to the military
base since it was federal property. 6 ' The court clarified the issue
by stating that "the exclusion of 'federal lands' from the term
'coastal zone' applies only to the land itself and not to the effects
on the surrounding nop-federal coastal zone that may be caused by
federal activities conducted on federal lands."'1 2 The court went on
to quote a Senate report which stated that federal consistency with
approved state coastal zone programs included "conducting or supporting activities in or out of the coastal zone which affect the
63
area."
In Ono v. Harper,6 4 Hawaii challenged a transfer of title of federal lands to private persons. The court held that "a consistency
determination is required under the CZMA when any federal activity directly affects the coastal zone of a state," even though federal
property is specifically excluded from the CZMA. 6' Since the mere
transfer of title does not change the way the land is being utilized,
it does not directly affect the coastal zone or the state's manage157.
158.
159.
Archer
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

16 U.S.C. § 1453(1) (1982).
Secretary of the Interior v. California, 464 U.S. 312, 315 (1984).
California Coastal Comm'n v. Granite Rock Co., 107 S. Ct. 1419, 1431 (1987); see
& Bondereff, supra note 141, at 129-30.
507 F. Supp. 1035 (D.P.R. 1981).
Id. at 1059.
Id. at 1060.
Id. (quoting S. REP. No. 94-277 (1976)).
592 F. Supp. 698 (D.C. Haw. 1983).
Id. at 700.
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ment program.16 6 Therefore, a consistency determination was not
required under the CZMA.'6 7
Controversy has also arisen over the meaning of "consistent to
the maximum extent practicable." In Cape May Greene, Inc. v.
Warren,168 New Jersey exempted a developer from its general prohibition against flood plain development, conditioned on the development obtaining sewage hookups. However, the EPA refused to
allow sewer hookups for the development.169 EPA claimed that its
actions were reasonable since it had authority to deter development in flood plains, as well as the power to enforce federal standards that are more demanding than state standards. 170 In response, the developers contended that EPA's actions were
inconsistent with the CZMA.1'' The EPA acknowledged that its
goal was to prevent development in the floodplain and conceded
that the restriction was unnecessary to insure the efficiency of the
172
sewage plant.
In determining that the EPA acted arbitrarily and capriciously
by imposing the restrictions, the court placed great emphasis on
the EPA's failure to "give sufficient weight to the congressional admonition in the Coastal Zone Management Act that, to the 'maximum extent practicable,' federal actions are to be consistent with
the state's management plan.' 73 Consistency to the maximum extent practicable is at the heart of the statutory scheme of encour74
aging, but not directing, state management of the coastal areas.
The court recognized the significance of local governments' role
under the CZMA by quoting a Senate report:
Local government does have continuing authority and responsibility
in the coastal zone.
Whenever local government has taken the initiative to prepare com166. Id.
167. Id.
168. 698 F.2d 179 (3d Cir. 1983).
169. Id. at 181.
170. Id. at 186. EPA contended that the consistency doctrine only required federal agencies not to allow activities prohibited under the state plan, while allowing federal agencies to
prohibit activities allowed under state plans. (Allowing prohibited development versus
prohibiting allowed development). Id. at 191.
171. Id. at 186.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 190-91.
174. Id. at 191.
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mercial plans and programs which fulfill the requirements of the
Federal and coastal state zone management legislation, such local
plans and programs should be allowed
to continue to function under
17 5
the state management program.
It is important to note that the court distinguished "federal activity" from "federal assistance" under a National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration regulation that would have allowed federal
agencies to have stricter standards than state management programs. 1 8 Therefore, the federal agencies are able to enforce stricter
standards when issuing federal permits, but otherwise are expected
to be consistent to the maximum extent practicable with state
programs.
When a federal agency concludes that an activity does not directly affect a state's coastal zone, the federal agency must notify
the appropriate state agency, which in Virginia is the Virginia
Council on the Environment ("Council").71 If a federal agency determines that an activity would directly affect Virginia's coastal
zone then the agency must determine whether the activity is consistent with the VCRMP. 7 s Similarly, if the federal agency finds
that an activity will directly affect Virginia's coastal zone but is
consistent with Virginia's management program, it must notify the
council. 179 Also, it is inherent in the notification requirement that
the state be given enough information in the consistency statement
to make an informed decision to either concur or object to the consistency determination. 8 0 After being notified of the finding, the
Council has forty-five days to notify the federal agency of any ob175. Id. at 192 (quoting S. REP. No. 753, 92d Cong., 2d Sess.
& ADMIN. NEWS 4776, 4779).
176. Schell, supra note 141, at 760.

-,

reprinted in 1972 U.S.

CODE CONG.

177. 15 C.F.R. § 930.35(d) (1988); see also NATIONAL OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN.,
supra note 101, at X-2, X-3.
178. NATIONAL OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., supra note 101, at X-2, X-3.
179. Id.
180. Commonwealth of P.R. v. Muskie, 507 F. Supp. 1035, 1059 (D.P.R. 1981). In response to the arrival of Cuban and Haitian refugees, the federal government, including the
United States Army, arranged to transform military sites in Puerto Rico into refugee camps.
Id. at 1041-44. Puerto Rico challenged the construction of the camps claiming failure to
comply with various environmental laws. Id. at 1044. The defendants sent a letter to the
Secretary of the Puerto Rico Department of Natural Resources asserting that the operations
on the federal land were consistent with the coastal zone program and would have no adverse effects on the coastal zone. Id. at 1058. The court noted that the purpose of such a
statement is to inform the state about the intended federal activity and thereby allow the
state to participate in determining whether the activity is consistent to the "maximum extent practicable" with the program. Id.
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jection to, or concurrence with, the consistency determination.1 8 1 If
the Council fails to make an objection within the forty-five day
period, then the Council is presumed to be in concurrence with the
consistency determination."8 2
If the Council and federal agency disagree about whether an activity directly affects the coastal zone or whether it is consistent
with the VCRMP, the Council may resort to mediation by the
United States Secretary of Commerce, or may pursue an injunction
in federal court to prevent the federal agency from proceeding with

an inconsistent activity. 83 Obviously, this review will have to be
coordinated with the localities. The recently promulgated regulations are understandably silent on this issue. Expeditious amendment will be appropriate once the CBPA is brought into the

Coastal Zone Management Program via the VCRMP.
The CZMA also regulates the issuance of all federal licenses and
permits for activities affecting any land or water use in the coastal
zone. 8 4 In order for activities to be subject to CZMA consistency
review, the state must provide the federal agencies with a list of
activities that describes the type of federal permit and license applications the state wishes to review. ls If an activity is unlisted,
the state must inform the federal agency and federal permit applicant that the proposed activity requires CZMA consistency review
within thirty days of receiving notice of the federal permit
86
application.1
When applying to a federal agency, an applicant for such federal
181.

NATIONAL OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN.,

supra note 101, at X-3.

182. Id.

183. Archer & Bondareff, supra note 141, at 119;

NATIONAL OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC AD-

MIN., supra note 101, at X-5.

184. 15 C.F.R. § 930.50 (1988); NATIONAL OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., supra note
101, at X-4; see, e.g., Southern Pac. Transp. Co. v. California Coastal Comm'n, 520 F. Supp.
800 (N.D. Cal. 1981). The California Coastal Commission in Southern Pac. sought to review
an Interstate Commerce Commission ("ICC") permit allowing Southern Pacific to tear up
old rail tracks on its right-of-way in accordance with the ICC abandonment decision. The
court noted that it was "Congress' intention to make compliance with the consistency review
procedure mandatory as to any applicant for a required federal license or permit." Southern
Pac., 520 F. Supp. at 803. The court went on to hold that the FCZMA was intended to
extend to ICC permits and that track removal is a future land use subject to consistency
review. Id. at 803-04.
185. 15 C.F.R. § 930.53 (1988); see also California Coastal Comm'n v. Granite Rock Co.,
107 S. Ct. 1419, 1430-31 (1987);

NATIONAL OCEANIC

& ATMOSPHERIC

ADMIN.,

supra note 101,

at X-4.
186. 15 C.F.R. § 930.54 (1988); see also Granite Rock Co., 107 S. Ct. at 1430-31;
OCEANIC

& ATMOSPHERIC

ADMIN.,

supra note 101, at X-4.

NATIONAL
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licenses or permits must provide the permitting agency with a certification that the proposed activity is consistent with Virginia's
coastal management program.1 7 An applicant must simultaneously
submit a copy of the application together with whatever information or data is necessary for the Council to review the applicant's
consistency certification.' 8 8 If necessary, the applicant must also
submit required NEPA documents. The federal agency may issue
the license or permit only if the Council expressly concurs, or presumptively concurs by failing to respond within six months of the
applicant's consistency certification, or if the United States Secretary of Commerce decides the proposal is consistent with the
CZMA's purpose or is necessary in the interest of national security.189 Still, the CZMA "does not compel a federal agency to issue a
permit for any activity which does not violate the provisions of an
approved coastal management plan."' 190 Federal agencies may deny
permits despite program consistency since federal criteria that are
more exacting than local criteria take precedence.' 9'
There have also been exceptions to the procedural rules regarding consistency review of permits. In Enos v. Marsh,9 2 the Army
Corps of Engineers approved the construction of an entrance channel and harbor basin without determining whether it was consistent with Hawaii's coastal zone management program. However,
the development project had begun prior to federal approval of
Hawaii's coastal management program. Under the CZMA and the
regulations promulgated under it, a consistency determination is
not required for development projects initiated prior to93 the approval of the state's coastal zone management program.
In Quinones Lopez v. Coco Lagoon Development Corp.,9 Lopez
challenged the issuance of a permit by the Army Corps of Engineers ("Corps"). The Corps admittedly did not comply with the
CZMA, by failing to require Coco Lagoon to submit a certificate of
187. NATIONAL OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., supra note 101, at X-4.
188. 15 C.F.R. § 930.50 (1988); see also NATIONAL OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC

ADMIN.,

supra

note 101, at X-4.

189. 15 C.F.R. § 930.50 (1988); NATIONAL OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., supra note
101, at X-4.
190. Hildreth & Johnson, supra note 141, at 139 n.209.
191.
192.
193.
194.

Id.
616 F. Supp. 32 (D.C. Haw. 1984), affd, 769 F.2d 1363 (9th Cir. 1985).
Id. at 62.
562 F. Supp. 188 (D.P.R. 1983).
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compliance with the coastal zone management program.'" However, because a formal certification procedure under the program
had not yet been established, the Corps notified the state agency
overseeing the program, who in turn gave the Corps a favorable
response. 196 The court held that the "corps cannot be found at
fault when there was no procedure to follow, particularly when, as
1' 97
here, it complied with the spirit of the law.
Where a state agency operates a federal license or permit program, such as the Virginia State Water Control Board operating
the NPDES permit program, concurrence of a consistency certification will be conclusively presumed upon the issuance of such a
license or permit. 98 If the Council objects to a consistency certification, it must give written notification to the applicant, the federal agency and the assistant administrator of NOAA. This notification must describe how the proposed activity is inconsistent and
the means to remedy the inconsistency, and the applicant's right to
appeal to the United States Secretary of Commerce. 9 9
Federal assistance to state and local governments for projects
that will affect the coastal zone is also subject to consistency review by the Council. 0° State and local government applications for
federal assistance must contain a consistency certification.2 1 The
application will be forwarded to the Council who must concur with
the consistency certification before the federal fund can be obligated to the project.20 2 If the Council does not object to the consistency certification within sixty days of receiving the application,
the Council will be presumed to have concurred with the certification and the federal agency may proceed with the assistance. 20 3
When the Council objects to federal assistance, it must follow the
195. Id. at 193.
196. Id. at 194.
197. Id.
198. NATIONAL OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., supra note 101, at X-5. "In the case of
the VMRC and the joint permitting process for local, state and federal wetlands permits the
issuance of a state wetland permit for any activity also requiring a Corps of Engineers' 404
permit shall constitute state concurrence with the consistency certification." Id.
199. 15 C.F.R. § 930.64 (1988).
200. Id. § 930.64; see also NATIONAL OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., supra note 101, at

X-6.
201. 15 C.F.R. § 930.90 (1988); see also NATIONAL

OCEANIC

& ATMOSPHERIC

ADMIN.,

supra

OCEANIC

& ATMOSPHERIC

ADMIN.,

supra

NATIONAL OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN.,

supra

note 101, at X-6.

202. 15 C.F.R. § 930.90 (1988); see also NATIONAL
note 101, at X-6.

203. 15 C.F.R. § 930.90 (1988); see also
note 101. at X-7.
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same notification procedure that applies to federal licenses and
permits.204
In Virginia, the CZMA is applied through the VCRMP 205 which
operates as a "networking" system.0 6 Under this system, the state
programs in the coastal zone are reviewed by the Virginia Council
on the Environment.2 7 Once the CBPA is incorporated into the
VCRMP, local governments affected by a federal consistency problem should have the option of directly notifying the Council on the
Environment or notifying the CBLAB who in turn could notify the
Council. If a federal action is in violation of a locality's CBPA ordinances, the Council would presumably object to a consistency determination or certification based on the information supplied by
the locality.
B. Consistency of State Agencies with Local Programs Implemented Under the Chesapeake Bay PreservationAct
Upon implementation of the CBPA, conflicts may arise between
localities and state agencies when state agencies either initiate inconsistent projects or issue permits for inconsistent activities. For
instance, the State Department of Transportation may seek to construct a road through an area which has been designated by a locality as a "preservation area" or "management area," and therefore, the project might be in violation of the local program. While a
state agency would not ordinarily be restricted by a local regulation, there exist measures within the CBPA and within the
VCRMP, which the CBPA will presumably be part of, that are
designed to address these situations.
State agency "consistency" should be enhanced because a sister
agency promulgated the criteria, 208 and state agencies are required

to give due consideration to any comments submitted by other
state agencies when developing criteria. 20 9 However, since localities
204. 15 C.F.R. § 930.90 (1988); see also NATIONAL OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., supra
note 101, at X-6, X-7.
205. Authority for the VCRMP is found in Executive Order 12 (June 30, 1978) which
"binds all state coastal resource management activities into a coordinated effort and requires that those activities be consistent with the VCRMP." NATIONAL OCEANIC & ATMoSPHERIC ADMIN., supra note 101, at IV-1, IV-2.
206. NATIONAL OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN,

supra note 101, at IV-3.

207. Id. at IV-4.
208. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 10.1-2103, -2107 (Repl. Vol. 1989).
209. Id. § 10.1-2107(D).
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have the ability to impose standards much stricter than those required by the criteria,210 the extent of state "consistency" remains
uncertain. State agencies may find themselves subject to more
stringent standards than they suggested to the CBLAB or the
CBLAB actually promulgated. Also, state agencies are likely to be
subject to standards that vary in stringency depending upon the
local jurisdiction. For convenience, agencies would presumably
seek to avoid compliance with local restrictions absent laws to enforce compliance.
The General Assembly must have recognized that in order for
the CBPA to be effective it would have to be binding upon more
than just local governments and private citizens. Therefore, provisions were added to the CBPA that make it binding on state agencies. The first section of the CBPA highlights the necessity of protecting the public interest in the state waters and promoting the
general welfare of the Commonwealth's citizens. 1 ' In particular,
the General Assembly acknowledged that localities need the cooperation and conformity of state agencies to effectuate the goals of
the CBPA.21 2 The realization of these goals requires that "all agencies of the Commonwealth exercise their delegated authority in a
manner consistent with the water quality protection provisions" of
local governments created under the CBPA.213 While this section
of the CBPA does not actually require state agencies to comply
with local regulations, it is a prelude to more specific sections of
the CBPA that require conformity by state agencies.
Several sections of the CBPA expressly grant localities authority
to create restrictions on state agencies in order to protect the state
waters and the Bay in particular. In a general grant of power, section 10.1-2108 of the Code of Virginia authorizes localities to "exercise their police and zoning powers to protect the quality of state
waters.12 14 However, this section does not bind state agencies to

conform with local regulations. Rather, it merely satisfies Dillon's
Rule 215 by expressly granting to localities the power to protect
210. See, e.g., 6:1 Va. Regs. Reg. 3245, § 3.1 (1989) (the criteria merely provide direction
for local governments); id. at 16, § 4.1(B) (localities may exercise discretion in determining
site-specific boundaries); id. at 21, § 5.2(c) ("[CBLAB] manual is for the purpose of guidance only and is not mandatory" for localities).
211. VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-2100 (Repl. Vol. 1989).
212. See id.
213. Id. § 10.1-2100(A)(iii).
214. Id. § 10.1-2108.
215. Supra note 26 and accompanying text.
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state waters, which otherwise would be reserved by the Commonwealth. Furthermore, this grant of power is qualified by section
10.1-2113 of the Code, which ensures that other local governmental
authority remains unaffected.216
Probably the most far reaching grant of authority to localities in
the CBPA (at least on its face) is found in section 10.1-2114 of the
Code. This section is an apparent attempt by the General Assembly to force state agencies to respect and conform to local programs imposed under the CBPA. It directs all state agencies to act
in a manner consistent with local restrictions and ordinances.2
While this appears to be a generous grant of power to localities, it
also raises some important issues. First, what exactly does the
phrase "in a manner consistent with the provisions" of local programs require of state agencies?2 18 The degree of consistency re-

quired of state agencies to satisfy the CBPA remains a crucial uncertainty. If the CBPA stated "to the maximum extent
practicable" as in the CZMA, then the answer would be much easier to predict.
The corollary to the first issue is who has the power to determine
and enforce consistency under the CBPA. The CBPA provides the
CBLAB with the power to enforce the CBPA against localities,21 9
but is silent on the issue of enforcement against other state agencies. One interpretation would have the state agencies govern
themselves, by making their own consistency determinations. Another possibility would allow localities to institute legal actions to
determine and enforce consistency. Presumably, localities would
bring an action for an injunction or possibly a writ of mandamus to
216. VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-2113 (Repl. Vol. 1989).
The authorities granted herein are supplemental to other state, regional and local
governmental authority. No authority granted to a local government by this chapter
shall affect in any way the authority of the State Water Contrdl Board to regulate
industrial or sewage discharges under Articles 3 (§ 62.1-44.16 et seq.) and 4 (§ 62.144.18 et seq.) of the State Water Control Law (§ 62.1-44.1 et. seq.). No authority
granted to a local government by this chapter shall limit in any way any other planning, zoning, or subdivision authority of that local government.

Id.
217. Id. § 10.1-2114. All agencies of the Commonwealth shall exercise their authorities
under the Constitution and laws of Virginia in a manner consistent with the provisions of
comprehensive plans, zoning ordinances and subdivision ordinances that comply with §§
10.1-2109 and 10.1-2110. Id. Compare VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-457 with id.
218. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
219. VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-2104 (Repl. Vol. 1989). "The Board shall have the exclusive
authority to institute legal actions to ensure compliance by local governing bodies with this
chapter and with any criteria or regulations adopted hereunder." Id.
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force state agencies to conform with the local programs. However,
since the CBPA does not expressly grant localities the authority to
institute such actions, Dillon's Rule may prevent localities from
doing so, unless the court is willing to infer such a grant of authority from the CBPA. The last possibility would have the CBLAB
instituting actions against other state agencies on behalf of the localities, either at the localities' request or on the CBLAB's own
initiative.
Regardless of the method of enforcement permitted under the
CBPA, the issue may be moot since the VCRMP prescribes its own
method for enforcing programs within the VCRMP. Assuming the
CBPA is incorporated into the VCRMP, there will be at least one
method of enforcement available, in addition to whatever other
means of enforcement are permissible under the CBPA.
The VCRMP, as indicated previously, is a state program
designed to protect the coastal resources of Virginia in conjunction
with the coastal resources of neighboring states. The VCRMP operates on a "networking" system.220 Under this system, all the state
agencies which regulate matters relating to coastal zone management are linked together through the Council on the Environment
(COE), which coordinates the activities of the various agencies.22 1
While the COE is not statutorily empowered to coordinate and
control the various state agencies' actions, it does have authority
stemming from an executive order.22 2 The order directs all state
agencies to exercise their powers in a manner consistent with the
VCRMP and in a manner which promotes coordination among
those agencies.223 Furthermore, the order requires state agencies
that conduct activities which may affect coastal resources conduct
the activities "ina manner consistent with and supportive of [the
VCRMP]. ' ' 224 Still, the executive order does not give localities a
judicial recourse for violations of their local programs by state
agencies. Instead it offers an administrative method for enforcing
the local programs.
As an administrative method for enforcement, the VCRMP has
its own guidelines and procedures for ensuring consistency and co220.

NATIONAL OCEANIC

221.
222.
223.
224.

Id. at IV-4.
Exec. Order No. 13 (1986).
Id.
Id.

& ATMOSPHERIC

ADMIN.,

supra note 101, at IV-3.
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operation between the various state agencies. Within the VCRMP,
there is a hierarchy of authority that oversees the management and
coordination of the "network" elements, i.e. the state agencies.
Every person who is within the line of authority is required to exercise their authority in a manner that furthers the goals of the
VCRMP. 2 5 On the bottom of the hierarchial ladder are the various
state agencies which operate according to their own programs.2 26
Next in line is the COE which acts as the program manager.2 2 7
COE is headed by its administrator, who is under the direction of
the Secretary of Natural Resources.2 2
The COE has the responsibility of monitoring the various agencies' actions in order to recognize and address any consistency
problems that might arise within the state.2 29 The COE oversees
the agencies and ensures their consistency with the VCRMP by
utilizing various monitoring devices.2 30 When consistency problems
do arise within the state government, the administrator confers
with the appropriate agency head to resolve the inconsistency.2 31 If
the administrator and the agency head cannot resolve the inconsistency, then the Secretary of Natural Resources is called upon to
settle the matter.2 3 The secretary may resolve the problem
through his own authority, or consult with other cabinet offices. 233
If the Secretary of Natural Resources cannot resolve the inconsistency then, as a last resort, the Governor is responsible for resolv225. "Any person having authority to resolve consistency problems under the terms of
this Executive Order shall resolve those problems in a manner which furthers the goals and
objectives of the Program as set forth above and in accordance with existing state law, regulations and administrative procedures." Id.
226. NATIONAL OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., supra note 101, at IV-3.
227. Id. at IV-4. The Council on the Environment was authorized to assist the Secretary
of Natural Resources in carrying out the responsibilities with respect to the VCRMP under
VA. CODE ANN. § 10-186. Id. at IV-1.
228. NATIONAL OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., supra note 101, at IV-1 to -5.
229. Id. at IV-4.
230. Id. The Council on the Environment monitors the agencies under the VCRMP
"through review of the following types of information:
- Notices of applications for state environmental permits.
- Periodic reports by state agencies and permit applications and issuances, etc.
- Agendas and minutes of agency meetings.
Other state agency publications such as newsletters.
- News Media.
Comments and questions by interested parties." Id.
231. Id.
232. Id. at IV-5.
233. Id.
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ing the matter. 3 4
Uncertainties still exist concerning the position of localities
within the VCRMP. Based on the existing VCRMP networking
system, the CBPA, if incorporated into the VCRMP, should be
represented within the VCRMP by the Chesapeake Bay Local Assistance Board and possibly by the individual localities. In the
event a state agency consistency problem arises, the local government affected by the state agency's action may have the option of
directly notifying the COE, or notifying the CBLAB which in turn
in could notify the COE. If a state agency's actions violated a locality's program, the COE would presumably contact the violating
agency and begin the previously mentioned administrative procedure for effectuating agency consistency.
VI.

LOCALITIES-PRIVATE LAND OWNERS

A. Fifth Amendment Taking Considerationsin the Administration of the Chesapeake Bay PreservationAct
Essentially, the fifth amendment's "taking clause" requires the
government to pay just compensation to private individuals whose
property is taken for the public good.2 3 5 Conversely, the government does not have to pay for incidental harm to private property
occasioned by the exercise of the police power.2 36
Courts have recognized, however, that an excessive use of the police power can constitute a taking, thus requiring compensation.
This concept is known as inverse condemnation. The difficult issue
is determining when the legitimate exercise of the police power is
so excessive that it constitutes a taking. Since 1978, the Supreme
Court has decided a number of significant "takings" cases which
cast light upon this and other takings issues.2 31
The Court has not articulated a test for determining what constitutes a taking, 2 8 but a review of the Court's opinions since 1978
234. Id.
235. U.S. CONST. amend. V.

236. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922) ("Government hardly
could go on if to some extent values incident to property could not be diminished without
paying for every such change in the general law.").
237. See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n., 483 U.S. 825 (1987); First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987); Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987); Agins v. City of Tiberon, 447 U.S. 255
(1980); Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 428 U.S. 104 (1978).
238. E.g., Penn Central Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 124 ("[tlhis Court, quite simply, has
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suggests that it commonly uses a structured analysis. The Court
looks at whether the regulation: (1) substantially advances a legitimate state interest; and (2) the extent to which it deprives the
owner of the use of his land." 9 Robert H. Freilich and Stephen P.
Chinn call the first step the "legitimacy analysis" and break it
down into a two-prong inquiry. 4 0 According to Freilich and Chinn,
the Court examines: (1) whether the purpose of the regulatory action is a "legitimate state interest," and if so, (2) whether the
means used to achieve the objective "substantially advance the intended purpose."2 41 "If the regulatory action passes muster under
the legitimacy review, it is only then that the court must undertake
the second inquiry into the regulation's economic impact on the
property owner."24' 2
The sovereign's interest is probably the most dynamic portion of
the equation because it constantly changes in order to meet the
needs of a changing society. Both the United States Supreme
Court2 43 and the Supreme Court of Virginia24 4 recognized the fluid
nature of the sovereign's interest in their early zoning decisions.
Since the early sixties many environmental laws and regulations
have been promulgated in order to meet the explosion of environmental concerns: water pollution, air pollution, the greenhouse effect, acid rain, ozone depletion, oil spills, hazardous waste, and
species extinction. It is unlikely that a reviewing court would find
that a state is without a legitimate interest in protecting the environment. Indeed, in a state like Virginia, which has placed a clean
been unable to develop any 'set formula' for determining when 'justice and fairness' require
that economic injuries caused by public action be compensated by the government, rather
than remain disproportionately concentrated on a few persons").
239. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 834 ("[w]e have long recognized that land-use regulation does
not affect a taking if it 'substantially advance[s] legitimate state interests' and does not
'deny any owner economically viable use of his land' "); Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n. v.
DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 492-93 ("[n]onetheless, we need not rest our decision on [the
legitimacy of the police power] alone, because petitioners have also failed to make a showing
of diminution of values sufficient to satisfy the test set forth in Pennsylvania Coal and our
other regulatory takings cases').; Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980) ("[tlhe
application of a general zoning law to a particular property effects a taking if the ordinance
does not substantially advance legitimate state interests, or denies an owner economically
viable use of his land").
240. Freilich & Chinn, Finetuning the Taking Equation: Applying it to Development
Exactions, Part I, LAND USE L. & ZONING DIG., Feb. 1988, at 3, 8.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 386-87 (1926).
244. See West Bros. Brick v. City of Alexandria, 169 Va. 271, 281, 192 S.E. 881, 885
(1937).
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environment section in its constitution, 4 5 the state interest in land
use decisions adversely affecting the natural environment is direct
and compelling. 246 Thus, in most cases, little would be achieved by
challenging the CBPA on the ground that its purpose is not a legitimate state interest.
In Virginia, localities historically have been subject to a kind of
legitimacy analysis called Dillon's Rule. 47 Thus, determining what
constitutes a "legitimate local interest" is relatively simple because
the General Assembly decrees these interests. Under the CBPA the
localities are given a mandate to: (1) protect water quality; and (2)
protect certain lands "called Chesapeake Bay Preservation Areas."2 48 It is difficult to imagine that local zoning would be declared
a taking based upon this initial component of the legitimacy
review.
245. VA. CONsT. art. XI, § 1.
246. Virginia's interest is not without limit, however. It remains subject to challenge on
grounds of federal preemption. See, e.g., City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc.,
411 U.S. 624 (1973) (zoning ordinance restricting hours of operation of planes preempted by
pervasive federal regulation); Lauricella v. Planning and Zoning, 32 Conn. Supp. 104, 342
A.2d 374 (1974) (state law regulating tidal wetlands preempted local ordinance). But see
Huron Portland Current Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960) (local ordinance regulating ship
air emissions not preempted by federal regulatory scheme that was for different purpose);
DeCoals, Inc. v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 284 S.E.2d 856 (W. Va. 1981) (upholding zoning
prohibition on fugitive dust from coal tipple notwithstanding regulatory permits issued by
West Virginia Department of Natural Resources, West Virginia Air Pollution Control Commission, and Department of the Army Corps of Engineers).
For additional cases on preemption, see Pace v. Board of Adjustment, 492 So. 2d 412 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1986); People v. Poveromo, 71 Misc. 2d 524, 336 N.Y.S.2d 764 (N.Y. Crim. Ct.
1972); Harvard Refuse, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 18 Ohio App. 3d 80, 481 N.E.2d 656 (1984);
Municipality of Monroeville v. Chambers Dev. Corp., 88 Pa. Commw. 603, 491 A.2d 307
(1985); Sunny Farms, Ltd. v. North Codorus, 81 Pa. Commw. 371, 474 A.2d 56 (1984); J.M.
Mills, Inc. v. Murphy, 116 R.I. 54, 353 A.2d 661 (1976); Wisconsin's Envtl. Decade, Inc. v.
Department of Natural Resources, 85 Wis. 2d 518, 271 N.W.2d 69 (1978).
In general, these cases attempt to determine one of the following: (1) whether there is
express preemption; if not, has the dominant legislative body either (2) created a scheme so
pervasive as to make reasonable inference that no room is left to supplement; or (3) whether
interest is so dominant that it will be assumed to preclude other laws.
For cases considering commerce clause implications of environmental legislation, compare
City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978) (New Jersey ban on out-of-state
garbage fell "squarely within the area that the commerce clause [put] off limits to state
regulations because New Jersey acted with protectionist reasons") with Shayne Bros. v. District of Columbia, 592 F. Supp. 1128 (D.D.C. 1984) (District's prohibition on receiving Maryland and Virginia trash does not violate the commerce clause because the district acted in
proprietary capacity). See also Evergreen Waste Sys., Inc. v. Metropolitan Serv. Dist., 643
F. Supp. 127 (D. Or. 1986); Lefrancois v. Rhode Island, 669 F. Supp. 1204 (D.R.I. 1987).
247. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
248. VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-2100 (Repl. Vol. 1989).
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However, the pale can be transgressed. For example, the January
Draft Regulations circulated by the CBLAB provided that "[a]
program shall consist of those elements which are necessary or appropriate to . . . [m]inimize adverse impacts on the quality of
state waters and aquatic habit. . .. 249 It is not entirely clear what
was contemplated by the directive to protect aquatic habit. It is
clear, however, that to ensure validity under the first prong of a
legitimacy analysis, localities should restrict themselves to the two
interests articulated in the preamble of the CBPA; protecting
water quality and Chesapeake Bay Preservation Areas.
The second prong of the legitimacy analysis is the review of the
means chosen to implement the sovereign's interest. This prong
was discussed in depth in the landmark case of Nollan v. California Coastal Commission.25" Nollan invalidated a California regulation which required a homeowner to give a lateral easement across
his property as a condition for a building permit. The regulation
was necessary because of the state's interest in protecting the public's view and psychological awareness of the beach.2 51 In rejecting
California's regulation, the Court did not challenge the state's interest but, rather, the means employed:
It is quite impossible to understand how a requirement that people
already on the public beaches be able to walk across the Nollans'
property reduces any obstacles to viewing the beach created by the
new house. It is also impossible to understand how it lowers any
"psychological barrier" to using the public beaches. .... 5'
Indeed, the Court went on to characterize California's exaction as
"'an out-and-out plan of extortion.' ,1253
The Nollan decision has forced lawyers to reexamine this second
component of the analytical process. Uncertainty now exists as to
how tightly tailored the regulation must be to the goal, and
whether it is proper to have an intermediate or strict level of scru249. January Draft Regulations, supra note 88, at § II.1.B. (emphasis added).
250. 483 U.S. 834 (1987); see Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260. ("[t]he application of a
general zoning law to a particular property effects a taking if the ordinance does not substantially advance legitimate state interests .... ") (emphasis added).
251. Psychological awareness of clean water is not a legitimate interest of Virginia localities under the CBPA.
252. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 838 (1987).
253. Id. (quoting J.E.D. Assocs. v. Atkinson, 121 N.H. 581, 584, 432 A.2d 12, 14-15
(1981)).
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tiny applied to local land use decisions when a constitutional
right,2 54 secured by the Bill of Rights, is at issue. Furthermore, it is
not known whether Nollan is limited to exaction cases. The relationship between "interest" and "method" should be the focus of
the next round of takings cases. As a result of this uncertainty,
localities are at risk of regulatory takings under the CBPA.
Several qualitative tests for judging the relationship between interest and method have emerged.2 55 In Virginia, reviewing the
holding in Board of County Supervisors v. Rowe2 " is appropriate
because it was cited favorably in Nollan on this issue.
Rowe concerned an ordinance which required the dedication of a
fifty-five feet wide strip of land as a precedent to development.
The purpose of the required dedication was to provide land necessary for providing a road, "the need for which [was] substantially
generated by public traffic demands rather than by proposed development. ' 257 The Supreme Court of Virginia found this
mandatory dedication violated article I section 11 of the Constitution of Virginia which expressly and unequivocally provides "that
the General Assembly shall not pass any law. . . whereby private
property shall be taken or damaged for public uses, without just
compensation."2 5 8 The violation resulted because the Supreme
Court of Virginia found that the development did not create the
primary need for the road.2 59 Hence, the regulation was not
60
reasonable.
254. Such as the fifth amendment's protection against taking private property for public
purpose without payment of just compensation.
255. See Brooks, Exactions After Nollan, 8 VA. J. NAT. RESOURCES L. 141, 148 (1988).
256. 216 Va. 128, 216 S.E.2d 199 (1975). The relationship between method and means was
not a significant component of the Supreme Court of Virginia's opinion. Precisely how the
Supreme Court of Virginia will handle this issue remains to be seen.
257. Id. at 138, 216 S.E.2d at 208.
258. Id.
259. The precise question before us is whether a local governing body has the power to
enact a zoning ordinance that requires individual land owners, as a condition to the
right to develop their parcels, to dedicate a portion of their fee for the purpose of
providing a road, the need for which is substantially generated by public traffic demands rather than by the proposed development.
Id. at 138, 216 S.E.2d at 208-09.
260. See also Simpson v. City of North Platte, 206 Neb. 240, 292 N.W.2d 297, 301 (1980)
("[tihe distinction . . . which must be made between an appropriate exercise of the police
power and an improper exercise of eminent domain is whether the requirement has some
reasonable relationship or nexus to the use to which the property is being made . . .");
Town of Longboat Key v. Lands End, Ltd., 433 So. 2d 574, 576 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983)
("[e]xactions . . . 'are permissible so long as [they] . . . offset reasonable needs sufficiently
attributable to the [development]' "); J.E.D. Assocs. v. Town of Atkinson, 121 N.H. 581, -,
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Localities should consider each proposed land use decision under
the CBPA using the this legitimacy analysis and should limit their
activities to protection of water quality and Chesapeake Bay Protection Areas. Ordinance provisions should be tailored, as the circumstances warrant, to protecting these interests.261 In this way localities should withstand a legitimacy review.
As noted earlier, however, if an ordinance passes a legitimacy
review, the review process is not complete. The court must then
decide whether the regulation has gone too far and whether "the
public at large, rather than a single owner, must bear the burden of
[the] exercise of state power in the public interest.

..."Ie Exactly

when a regulation goes so far as the constitute a taking is one of
the most perplexing questions of our time. For practical purposes,
one must comb the many "takings" cases and find a favorable decision with similar facts, because determining when diminution
reaches a certain magnitude, so as to amount to an exercise of emi63
2
nent domain "depends upon the particularfacts.3

A few general principles have emerged which are useful in determining whether a taking has occurred. These include:
(1) Mere fluctuations in value during the process of governmental
decision making, absent extraordinary delay, are incidents of ownership that do not constitute a taking;264 (2) mere assertion of regulatory jurisdiction by a governmental body does not constitute a
taking;265 (3) the regulation must deprive the owner of all reasonable use of his property viewed as a whole in order to constitute a
taking; 6 (4) a physical invasion by the sovereign constitutes a tak432 A.2d 12, 15 (1981) ("[a locality] may not attempt to extort from a citizen a surrender of
his right to just compensation for any part of his property that is taken from him for public
use as a price for permission to exercise his right to put his property to whatever legitimate

use he desires subject only to reasonable regulations").
261. Tailoring zoning ordinances to protection of the resource is made more difficult by
the Board's determination that the Board, and not localities, delineates the scope of Chesapeake Bay Preservation Areas. Under the regulations published for comment, zoning must
exclude development within one hundred feet of the tidal shore. The VIMS factors, however, suggest that not all shoreline is sensitive. See supra notes 97-98 and accompanying
text. Statewide regulations, as opposed to site specific determinations should encourage development of this prong of the "taking" test.
262. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n. v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 492 (1987) (quoting
Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980)).
263. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922).
264. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 263 n.9 (1980).
265. Hodell v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
266. No taking occurs (at least in Virginia) unless an individual is deprived of all reasonable use of his property. See Commonwealth v. County Utils., 223 Va. 534, 542, 290 S.E.2d
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ing for which compensation is required;117 and (5) a regulation can
"take" all property without requiring compensation if the regulation acts to prevent a nuisance.2""
867, 872 (1982):
All citizens hold property subject to the proper exercise of the police power for the
common good. Even where such an exercise results in substantial diminution of property values, an owner has no right to compensation therefore ....
[N]o taking occurs in these circumstances unless the regulation interferes with all reasonable beneficial uses of the property, taken as a whole.
Id.; accord Boggs v. Board of Supervisors, 211 Va. 488, 491, 178 S.E.2d 508, 510 (1971) ("if
the application of a zoning ordinance has the effect of completely depriving the owner of the
beneficial use of his property by precluding all practical uses, the ordinance is invalid as to
that property"). Compare First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 321 (1987) ("[w]e merely hold that where the government's activities
have already worked a taking of all use of property . . . [compensation is requried]").
In Jackson v. City Council, 659 F. Supp. 470 (W.D. Va. 1987) the federal courts were
called upon to determine whether an ordinance which prohibited off-site advertisements
(billboard ban) violated the fifth amendment. In holding that it did not, the court stated:
"[T]he plaintiff must shoulder a heavy burden in establishing a taking claim.. . . An ordinance which merely deprives the owner of the highest and best use of his property, or causes
a diminution of its market value, does not constitute an unlawful taking." Id. at 475-76.
What constitutes "all reasonable" or "all practical uses" is uncertain and any case may
well turn on the ability of the advocate. See Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365
(1926) (75% diminution in value is not a taking); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394
(1915) (diminution in value by over 90% is not a taking); William C. Haas & Co. v. City of
San Francisco, 605 F.2d 1117 (9th Cir. 1979) (diminution in value of 95% is not a taking $2,000,000 to $100,000); Turnpike Realty v. Town of Dedham, 362 Mass. 221, 284 N.E.2d
891 (1972); (diminution in value at 88% is not a taking). But see Dooley v. Town Plan &
Zoning Comm'n, 151 Conn. 304, 197 A.2d 770 (1964) (diminution of 75% is a taking $800,000 to $60,000). Note that in Commonwealth v. County Utils., 223 Va. 534, 542, 290
S.E.2d 867, 872 (1982) the Virginia Supreme Court held that "in the case of a regulated
utility, the State may, under the police power, impose controls that are even more stringent
than those that can be impressed upon other private property owners." Id. at -,
290
S.E.2d at 872.
267. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982). ("[wle
conclude that a permanent physical occupation authorized by government is a taking without regard to the public interests that it may serve"). Pay particular attention to this distinction when dealing with "overlay zones" such as flood plains or Chesapeake Bay Preservation Areas. Compare United States v. Pewee Coal Co., 341 U.S. 114 (1951) (seizure of
mine to prevent strike constitutes a taking) with United States v. Central Eureka Mining
Co., 357 U.S. 155 (1958) (wartime directive that nonessential gold mines cease operations is
not a taking since no physical possession resulted).
268. In Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928), for example, the Supreme Court was faced
with a takings challenge to Virginia's Cedar Rust Act. In this case, the state had ordered the
plaintiff to cut down a large number of ornamental red cedar trees as a means of preventing
communication of a rust or plant disease with which they were infected to an apple orchard
in the vicinity. Neither the act as written or applied provided for compensation for trees
thus ordered destroyed. The Court rejected the takings challenge:
It would have been nonetheless a choice if, instead of enacting the present statute,
the state, by doing nothing, had permitted serious injury to the apple orchards within
its borders to go on unchecked. When forced to such a choice the state does not
exceed its constitutional powers by deciding upon the destruction of one class of
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In sum, a two-step analysis appears to be a sound, structured
way of considering takings issues. The first step must determine
whether the sovereign has a legitimate interest in the subject of
the regulation and if so, whether the regulation is reasonably related to the expressed interest. The second step must determine
whether the regulation has gone so far that the government, rather
than the individual, must bear the burden of the expense. The understanding and application of these factors by localities should reduce their exposure to takings violations.
B. Vested Rights in Relation to the Chesapeake Bay Preservation Act
"By its nature, the doctrine of vested rights is fraught with inconsistencies. Balancing the equities will always be a case-by-case determination based upon the facts a court deems relevant under the
26 9
circumstances."
As may be expected with many land use regulations, the implementation of the CBPA is destined to result in landowners and
developers bringing actions involving the issue of "vested rights."
Therefore, it will be useful to review the theory of "vested rights"
property in order to save another which, in the judgment of the legislature, is of
greater value to the public.
Id. at 279; see Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962) (sustaining an ordinance prohibiting the mining of sand and gravel below the water table; the Court reasoned
that the prohibition of a noxious use did not entitle the owners to compensation); Mugler v.
Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887) (sustaining a state law prohibiting the manufacturer and sale of
liquor on the basis that the state had the power to deem such activities public nuisances and
prohibit them); Reinman v. City of Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171 (1915) (in which the Court
upheld an ordinance banning livery stables within the city limits because they were a public
health nuisance). See also Penn Central Transp. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 144
(1978) ("[a]s early as 1887, the Court recognized that the government can prevent a property owner from using his property to injure others without having to compensate . . ."
(Rehnquist, J. dissenting); First English Evangelical Luthern Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 313 (1987) ("[w]e accordingly have no occasion to decide ... whether
the County might avoid the conclusion that a compensable taking had occurred by establishing that the denial of all use was insulated as a part of the State's authority to enact
safety regulations").
Of course, where regulation of a "nuisance" ends and a taking for public benefit begins
often begs the question. Compare Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761
(1972) (regulation of wetland is within the police power because it prohibits land users from
harming adjacnt navigable waters) with Morris County Land Improvement Co. v. Township
of Parsippany Troy Hills, 40 N.J. 539, 193 A.2d 32 (1963) (regulation of wetland requires
compensation because it is designed to confer a benefit on the public-clean water and water
retention area.)
269. F. SCHNIDMAN, S. ABRAMS & J. DELANEY, HANDLING THE LAND USE CASE § 9.25.5
(1984).
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and the foreseeable effect these rights will have on the implementation of the CBPA and vice versa. Section 10.1-2115 of the Code
of Virginia is designed to protect the vested rights of landowners
by specifically excluding vested rights from the scope of the
CBPA.2 70 Essentially, this section is a "grandfather clause". While
this section resolves the question of whether the CBPA affects
vested rights, it raises and leaves unresolved the issue of defining
and identifying "vested rights" and determining when they vest.
1. The Race to Vest
Generally, vested rights are considered to be those rights that
"cannot be interfered with by retrospective laws" or divested without the owner's consent unless by "established methods of procedure and for the public welfare."' 271 Still, this kind of definition
fails to provide any insight as to when a vested right exists. Instead, it merely highlights the qualities of a vested right. The more
significant point is determining how and when vested rights are
created.
The "vested rights" theory is an off-shoot of the "takings" doctrine.2 72 If the enforcement of a new regulation will result in an
unconstitutional taking of existing property rights that have already "vested," then the regulation will not apply.2 73 In the same
vein, the "nonconforming use" doctrine grants a large degree of
protection to lawfully existing and established land uses that predated existing regulations or prohibitions that would otherwise
make such uses illegal.2 74 The "vested rights" doctrine is the next
progression of the "nonconforming use" doctrine and extends protection to land uses that are in the process of being developed,
thereby allowing them to be completed and maintained. 27 Therefore, if a landowner is unable to show that a proposed use is sufficiently established to qualify for nonconforming use status, the
owner will have to satisfy a vested rights test in order to receive
270. "The provisions of this chapter shall not affect vested rights of any landowner under
existing law." VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-2115 (Repl. Vol. 1989).

271.

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY

1402 (5th Ed. 1979); see also American States Water Serv.

v. Johnson, 31 Cal. App. 2d 606, 88 P.2d 770, 774 (1939).
272. S.ROBIN, ZONING AND SUBDIVISION LAW IN VIRGINIA 66 (1980).
273. Id.
274. Cunningham & Kremer, Vested Rights, Estoppel and the Land Development Process, 29 HASTINGS L.J. 625, 669 (1978); see Hagman, The Vesting Issue: The Rights of Fetal
Development vis a vis the Abortions of Public Whimsy, 7 ENVTL. L. 519, 526 (1977).
275. Hagman, supra note 274, at 526.
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protection from the new regulation.27 6
In either nonconforming use or vested rights cases, the main issue is whether the "landowner's activities acquired sufficient status
to be accorded legal protection against new laws. 3' 77 Nonconforming use cases ask if the use was in existence when the law took
effect, whereas vested rights cases ask "whether the proposed use
had acquired so many of the characteristics of a property right
that it should receive protection as if it were an existing use of
' 8
27
property.
The "vesting rule" and the "equitable estoppel rule" are the two
basic tests used to determine whether a right has been acquired to
complete a project as conceived. 7 9 However, these rules are frequently confused with one another or treated as the same rule.28 0
The vesting rule is based on principles of common law and constitutional law, and focuses on the existence of real property rights
that cannot be taken away by government regulation. 28 ' The estoppel rule, which involves a balancing approach by necessity, is derived from equity and focuses on whether it would be equitable to
allow the government to repudiate its prior conduct. 2
The estoppel test, which acts to estop a local government from
enforcing its zoning regulation, has been stated a number of
ways. 8 3 A frequently used formulation of the rule states:
276. Cunningham & Kremer, supra note 274, at 669.
Though not actually a vested rights case, Virginia Electric & Power Co. v. Board of
County Supervisors, 226 Va. 382, 309 S.E.2d 308 (1983) is an example of where an owner
was unable to show a sufficiently established nonconforming use nor a vested right to develop the use. Virginia Electric & Power Co. sought to upgrade an existing use, a transmission line, without conforming to a use regulation. Despite having originally expended in
excess of $350,000 to acquire the right of way and having used it as a lower voltage transmission line, the court noted that there was no evidence Virginia Electric & Power Co. acquired the right of way with a plan to upgrade the line and, therefore, required compliance
with the applicable regulation.
277. Cunningham & Kremer, supra note 274, at 671.
278. Id.
279. F. SCHNIDMAN, S. ABRAMS & J. DELANEY, supra note 269, at § 9.25.1.
280. Cunningham & Kremer, supra note 274, at 648. Courts often improperly apply the
equitable estoppel rule resulting in an "imperfectly formulated rationale." See Heeter, Zoning Estoppel: Application of the Principles of Equitable Estoppel and Vested Rights to
Zoning Disputes, 1971 URB. L. ANN. 63, 65. This confusion of the rules is an example of the
courts either not understanding what they are saying or saying something other than what
they mean.
281. F. SCHNIDMAN, S. ABRAMS & J. DELANEY, supra note 269, at § 9.25.1.
282. Id.
283. D. HAGMAN & J. JUERGENSMEYER, URBAN PLANNING AND LAND DEVELOPMENT CONTROL
LAW § 5.10 (2d ed. 1986).

UNIVERSITY

OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 24:1

A local government exercising its zoning powers will be estopped
when a property owner, (1) relying in good faith, (2) upon some act
or omission of the government, (3) has made such extensive obliga-

tions and expenses that it would be highly inequitable
and unjust to
28 4
destroy the rights which he had ostensibly acquired.

The vesting rule has also been stated in various ways depending
upon the jurisdiction.2 85 Often both rules are referred to as zoning
estoppe 2 8 6 and in either case "the developer or builder must
demonstrate (1) the existence of a valid government act, (2) substantial reliance on the government act, (3) good faith, and (4) that
the rights are substantial enough to make it fundamentally unfair
to eliminate those rights."2 '
The leading Virginia case on this point is Board of Supervisors

v. Medical Structures, Inc. 2ss In this case, the Supreme Court of
Virginia declared:
[W]here. .. a special use permit has been granted under a zoning
classification, a bona fide site plan has thereafter been filed and diligently pursued, and substantial expense has been incurred in good
faith before a change in zoning, the permittee then has a vested
right to the land use described in the use permit and he cannot be
284. Cunningham & Kremer, supra note 274, at 649; see 9 P.
USE CONTROLS

§ 52.084][b] (1979); 1 R. ANDERSON,

ROHAN, ZONING AND LAND

AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING

§ 6.13 (2d ed.

1976) (quoting North Miami v. Marqulies, 289 So. 2d 424 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974)).
285. P. ROHAN, supra note 284, at § 52.08[4][b]; see Hagman, supra note 274, at 519.
To vest the right to develop land under the [Washington Vested Rights Rule], a party
must meet the following three-part test: A right to develop land vests if the applicant
files a building permit application that:
1) Complies with the existing zoning ordinances and building code (Compliance);
2) Is filed during the effective period of the ordinance under which the applicant
seeks to develop (Timeliness); and
3) Is sufficiently complete (Completeness).
Note, Washington's Zoning Vested Rights Doctrine, 57 WASH. L. REV. 139, 143 (1981).
286. Heeter, supra note 280 at 66.

287. F.

SCHNIDMAN,

S.

ABRAMS

& J. DELANEY, supra note 269, at § 9.25.2.

288. 213 Va. 35, 192 S.E.2d 799 (1972) (held that Medical Service had acquired a vested
right to completion of their project based on the special use permit and their good faith
expenditures in reliance on the zoning ordinance in force at the time of their original site
plan application); see Board of Supervisors v. Cities Serv. Oil Co., 213 Va. 359, 193 S.E.2d 1
(1972) (since Cities Service had purchased property for $186,500 in reliance upon the use
permit and had expended substantial sums of money to prepare its site plan, thereby substantially changing its position in good faith reliance on the existing zoning of the property,
it obtained a vested right in the land use upon the filing of the site plan); see also United
States v. County Bd., 487 F. Supp. 137, 141 (E.D. Va. 1979) (the United States tried to
prevent the construction of highrise buildings that would create an unsightly backdrop to
national monuments, but the court found vested rights existed).
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deprived of such use by subsequent legislation." 9

This approach to vested rights amounts to an exceptionally protective "early vesting" doctrine,2 9 0 particularly in comparison to other
jurisdictions and model acts. 91 Unfortunately, a general rule has
not evolved from the Virginia vested rights cases where special use
permits were not present; therefore, it is difficult to predict how
Virginia courts will apply the rule when presented with different
factual settings. General principles from other jurisdictions may
provide valuable guidance.
The governmental conduct element, though not considered to be
as important as the good faith or reliance elements,29 2 must be
such as to give the builder authorization to develop the use (i.e., a
building permit).9 It has been observed that a permit is merely "a
peg upon which an owner can hang his reliance," rather than an
immunity from a zoning change.29 4 The existence or the absence of
a zoning ordinance is not a governmental act that warrants reliance. 295 Therefore, the purchase of land in reliance on an existing
zoning classification will not endow the purchaser with a vested
right to commence uses authorized by such classification after a
more restrictive amendment is adopted.2 96 Similarly, a person who
purchases land in reliance upon its current zoning classification
289. 213 Va. 355, 358, 192 S.E.2d 799, 801 (1972).
290. L. BEVIER & D. BRION, supra note 36, at 123.
291. E.g., Avco Community Developers, Inc. v. South Coast Regional Comm'n, 17 Cal. 3d
785, 553 P.2d 546, 132 Cal. Rptr. 386 (1976) (upon the passage of the California Coastal
Zone Conservation Act, a developer, who had spent over two million dollars in reliance of
preliminary permits and approval granted by the proper officials, was denied the necessary
approval from the Coastal Commission needed to obtain a building permit and was found to
lack vested rights by the court); see MODEL LAND DEv. CODE § 2-309 (1975).
292. Heeter, supra note 280, at 82. "If a court is willing to allow zoning estoppel and finds
that good faith and substantial reliance were present, it will find some sort of governmental
conduct upon which the owner can he said to have relied." Id.
293. F. SCHNIDMAN, S. ABRAMS & J. DELANEY, supra note 269, at § 9.25.2. In Virginia,
courts have repeatedly found zoning site plan approvals to be presumptively valid government acts upon which landowners may claim reliance. United States v. County Bd., 487 F.
Supp. 137 (E.D. Va. 1979); Byrum v. Board of Supervisors, 217 Va. 37, 225 S.E.2d 369
(1976); Bolinger v. Board of Supervisors, 217 Va. 185, 227 S.E.2d 682 (1976).
Also, the decisions discussed supra note 288 indicate that the Supreme Court of Virginia
is willing to recognize a special use permit as a valid government act.
294. Heeter, supra note 280, at 83.
295. F. SCHNIDMAN, S. ABRAMS & J. DELANEY, supra note 269, at § 9.25.4 (citing Town of
Vienna v. Kohler, 218 Va. 966, 244 S.E.2d 542 (1978)).
296. R. ANDERSON, supra note 284, at § 6.20; see West Bros. Brick Co. v. Alexandria, 169
Va. 271, 192 S.E. 881 (1937), reh'g denied, 302 U.S. 781; see also Town of Vienna v. Kohler,
218 Va. 966, 244 S.E.2d 542 (1978).
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does not acquire a vested right to the continuation of that classification2 91 Further, a landowner does not have a vested right to continuation of the zoning of the general area in which he resides."'
However, it is crucial that the government act being relied upon
is valid. A landowner who relies upon a government act that is improper runs the serious risk of failing to establish a nonconforming
use. 2 9 A building permit that is in conflict with an applicable zoning ordinance is considered unauthorized and void ab initio; therefore, such a permit confers no vested rights on the permittee, even
though it was issued in good faith. 0 0 In essence, a permit issued in
violation of a zoning ordinance confers no greater rights upon a
permittee than the ordinance itself.3 0 ' Furthermore, Virginia courts
have declared that the doctrine of estoppel does not apply to the
30 2
discharge of governmental functions by local governments.
Unless a landowner relies in good faith upon official conduct,3 0 3 a
297. R. ANDERSON, supra note 284, at § 4.27; see also Allgood v. Tarboro, 281 N.C. 430,
189 S.E.2d 255 (1972); Kohler, 218 Va. 966, 244 S.E.2d 542.
298. R. ANDERSON, supra note 284 at § 4.27; see also Kohler, 218 Va. 966, 244 S.E.2d 542.
299. See, e.g., Board of Supervisors v. Booher, 232 Va. 478, 352 S.E.2d 319 (1987); Town
of Blacksburg v. Price, 221 Va. 168, 266 S.E.2d 899 (1980); Segaloff v. City of Newport
News, 209 Va. 259, 163 S.E.2d 135 (1968).
300. See Booher, 232 Va. 478, 352 S.E.2d 319 (1987) (upon the amendment of a zoning
ordinance, a landowner was forced to cease an established use several years after having his
property rezoned and the use approved by the zoning administrator since the use was never
a permitted use in any of the county's zones); Segaloff v. City of Newport News, 209 Va.
259, 163 S.E.2d 135 (1968) (a property owner was issued a building permit to construct a
store. Once construction had begun, an official noticed a zoning violation in the building's
design and notified that the violation would have to be corrected. The court held that the
city was not estopped from withdrawing the permit since it was issued in violation of a
zoning ordinance and that the zoning regulation may be enforced notwithstanding the fact
that the permittee and commenced construction in reliance of the permit); Town of Blacksburg v. Price, 221 Va. 168, 266 S.E.2d 899 (1980) (a person leased commercial property,
submitted a complete set of building and site plans to the proper officials, who in turn
issued him a building permit, then began construction immediately. After completing nearly
60% of the construction and having spent or committed to spend about $100,000, he was
informed that he had to change part of his building plans in order to conform with the
zoning ordinance).
301. Segaloff v. City of Newport News, 209 Va. 259, 163 S.E.2d 135 (1968); Hurt v. Caldwell, 222 Va. 91, 279 S.E.2d 138 (1981) (the court declared that a building permit issued in
violation of the law confers no greater rights upon a permittee than an ordinance itself. "An
erroneous construction by those charged with its administration cannot be permitted to
override the clear mandates of a statute") (quoting Richmond v. County of Henrico, 185 Va.
176, 189, 37 S.E.2d 873, 879 (1946)).
302. Board of Supervisors of Washington County v. Booher, 232 Va. 478, 481, 352 S.E.2d
319, 321 (1987); Segaloff v. City of Newport News, 209 Va. 259, 261, 163 S.E.2d 135, 137
(1968).

303. S.

ROBIN, ZONING AND SUBDIVISION LAW IN VIRGINIA

68 (1960). It should be noted that
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right to a nonconforming use will not be established." 4 The good
faith element of the vested rights tests focuses on the mental attitude of the landowner and is often defined by "what constitutes a
lack of good faith. ' 30 5 An owner must act with honest intentions
and not accelerate his development or increase his investment in
an attempt to escape rezoning through estoppel.3 0 8 Courts seem to
apply a subjective test for good faith, although an objective measure is often applied (i.e., "whether a reasonable property owner
would have acted in the fact of such a high probability that the
property would be rezoned"). 0
Courts generally look for a lack of notice of proposed changes in
the zoning ordinance or invalidity of the permit.30 8 Therefore,
when construction is continued before an appeal period has expired, the landowner risks a determination of bad faith. 09 Similarly, good faith is lacking if a landowner proceeds with improvements which will be proscribed by the adoption of an ordinance
that he knows or should know is pending.3 10 In this context, courts
have held that good faith actions in reliance, on the current zoning
refer to obligations incurred in relation to the property before the
owner learns of a pending rezoning.3 1 1 However, the fact that an
amendment is pending before a local legislature is not found by
most courts to be sufficient probability of bad faith. 2
A corollary to the good faith element is the "pending ordinance"
doctrine, which allows localities to deny an application for zoning
relief, if at the time of the application, a zoning ordinance is pendproperty owners and localities must both act in good faith. Therefore, a locality may not
delay the processing of a landowner's building application until it can rezone the property so
as to disallow the intended use, "with the full intent to defeat the property owner's attempt
to act pursuant to the existing zoning." Id.
304. R. ANDERSON, supra note 284, at § 6.13.
305. Heeter, supra note 280, at 77.
306. Id. at 78.
307. Id. at 79.
308. F. SCHNIDMAN, S. ABRAMS & J. DELANEY, supra note 269, at § 9.25.4.
309. Id. at 645-46.
310. R. ANDERSON, supra note 284, at § 6.05, (Cum. Supp. 1985). A pending ordinance is a
new zoning ordinance which has been proposed by a zoning commission, made open to public inspection, and advertised to be discussed at an upcoming public meeting. "However, an
ordinance does not become pending to a particular landowner until it is clear that the use
applied for is repugnant to the proposed ordinance." Id.; see 2 E.C. YOKELY, ZONING LAW
AND PRACTICE § 14-5 (4th ed. 1978 & Cum. Supp. 1988).
311. P. ROHAN, supra note 284, at § 52.08[4][b].
312. Heeter, supra note 280, at 79.
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ing which would prohibit the desired land use313 and public notice
has been given 14 If the proposed change is not yet a matter of
public record, the applicant is entitled to the permit based upon
3 15
the zoning existing at the time of the application.
Despite the significance placed upon the good faith element by
the majority of jurisdictions, the Supreme Court of Virginia seems
to have either downcast the role of good faith or has been willing
to presume its presence in the absence of convincing evidence to
the contrary. In Medical Structures, the court found good faith
even though Medical Structures actively continued to seek site
plan approval while the notice, hearing, and adoption process was
proceeding for a zoning amendment inconsistent with the proposed
site plan.31 6 Also, it has been observed that the "Cities Service
facts appear to involve a bizarre race between the board of supervisors to rezone and Cities Service to obtain site plan approval." 31 7
Regardless of the race, which saw Cities Service risk expenditures
on a site plan that was not filed until two months after the board
publicly proposed a zoning change, the court was willing to find
good faith. 1 '
The Supreme Court of Virginia's willingness to find good faith in
both Medical Structure and Cities Service lends itself to alternative interpretations. The holdings may signify a strong judicial policy in favor of development and protecting private rights. 3 9 On the
other hand, the court may have approached the cases with the view
that once the special use permit was obtained, the developer's actions were entitled to a presumption of good faith. In either case, it
is apparent that the court must have considered the developer's
possession of special use permits to be a critical factor.
313. R. ANDERSON, supra note 284, at § 6.05, (Cum. Supp. 1985); see Appeal of Gillies
Corp.,.430 A.2d 694 (Pa. Commw. 1981).
314. P. ROHAN, supra note 284, at § 52.08[4][b]; E.C. YOKELY, supra note 310, at § 14-5.
315. P. ROHAN, supra note 284, at § 52.08[4][b].
316. Board of Supervisors v. Medical Structures, Inc., 213 Va. 355, 357, 192 S.E.2d 799,
801 (1972); L, BEVIER & D. BRION, supra note 36, at 61-62. A gap of six years between the
grant of the special use permit and the initial filing of the site plan raises the question of
whether Medical Structures had been diligent and acted in good faith. It is also unclear on
how much of the $247,500 expenditures was made after the zoning amendments were first
proposed. L. BEVIER & D. BRION, supra note 36, at 63.
317. L. BEVIEN & D. BRION, supra note 36, at 63 (discussing Board of Supervisors v. Cities
Serv. Oil Co. 213 Va. 359, 193 S.E.2d 1 (1972)).
318. Id. "Nor does [the court] explain why Cities Service should have been able to rely on
the existing zoning when it purchased the property five months after the announcement of
the proposed zoning change." Id.
319. Id. at 61-63.
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Jurisdictions differ on how substantial the landowner's reliance
upon current zoning must be in order for a landowner to establish
vested rights in a nonconforming use. 2 0 This is a particularly sen-

sitive issue in an era of large projects requiring multiple permits
from diverse governmental agencies.3 21 Generally, a use must be

"existing and actual" as opposed to "planned or intended," and
the use must be "substantial" for a right to vest.32 2 Some jurisdictions, such as Virginia, hold that no actual physical construction is
required, but that substantial expenditures, the undertaking of
considerable contractual commitments, and extensive preparatory
work will give rise to vested rights. 23 However, most courts agree
that merely purchasing the land without some greater reliance will
not constitute sufficient reliance. 24
Substantial reliance can be measured in various ways.3 25 The
majority of courts apply a "set quantum" test, which requires the
owners to have "changed position beyond a certain set degree or
amount, measured quantitatively.

' 326

Another less common test

used in close cases is the balancing test, which requires the court to
weigh the owner's interest in establishing a use against the public's
interest in enforcing the restriction.3 2 1 Some of the factors courts
consider include "the type of preparations made by a property
owner prior to putting his property to a certain use, whether the
owner acted in good faith, how substantial were the incurred expenses, and whether
the expenses were directly related to its in8
tended use.

32

In Medical Structures, the Supreme Court of Virginia noted
that the site plan 329 is the main obstacle in obtaining a building
320.
321.
322.
323.
324.
325.
at 85.
326.

P. ROHAN, supra note 284, at § 52.08[4][b]; Heeter, supra note 280, at 85.
P. ROHAN, supra note 284, at § 52.08[4][b].
S. ROBIN, supra note 272, at 66; Heeter, supra note 280, at 85.
P. ROHAN, supra note 284, at § 52.08[4][b].
Heeter, supra note 280, at 86.
D. HAGMAN & J. JUERGENSMEYER, supra note 283, at § 5.11; Heeter, supra note 280,
Heeter, supra note 280, at 85; D.

HAGMAN & J. JUERGENSMEYER,

supra note 283 at

§ 5.11.
327. Heeter, supra note 280, at 88.
328. D. HAGMAN & J. JUERGENSMEYER, supra note 283, at § 5.11.
329. In general, a "site plan" is a physical plan showing the layout and design of the site
of a proposed use, prepared by the building or developer. It generally should indicate
the proposed location of all structures, parking areas, and open space on the plot and
their relations to adjacent roadways and uses. Specifically, items such as grade elevation levels, drainage plans, means of access, landscaping, screening, architectural features, building dimensions and other elements relevant to the community welfare are
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permit, and that once site plans have been approved, permits are
almost always issued. 33 0 This seems to indicate that when determining whether there has been sufficient reliance, the court looks
at the greatest obstacle an owner must overcome in the process of
establishing a use. Consequently, two main factors the court considers when looking for substantial reliance appear to be: (1) the
amount of expenditures made in reliance on a government act; and
(2) how far in the development process the owner has progressed.
It is difficult to predict how Virginia courts will react to vested
rights challenges to the CBPA until more cases are heard by the
Supreme Court of Virginia. The most critical determination to be
made by the court is probably the relationship between the good
faith requirement and the CBPA. If Medical Structures and Cities
Service foreshadow what is to come, it is likely that many landowners seeking to develop a use will be able to escape the CBPA
by racing to vest.
It commonly is recognized that the land rush in Tidewater Virginia is on. It started shortly after passage of the CBPA in March,
1988 and accelerated with the circulation of draft criteria in January, 1989.
Nevertheless, there exists one possible solution to cutting short
the vesting race. Under Section 109.1 of the Virginia Uniform
Statewide Building Code33 ' a building official need not issue a
building permit unless he is satisfied that "the proposed work conforms to. . .all applicable laws and ordinances." '3 2 Thus, if a particular project might pose a risk to the Chesapeake Bay or its
tributaries, the building official could arguably deny the permit.
Authority for this analysis is found in Polygon Corp. v. City of
Seattle."'3
In. Polygon, the Polygon Corporation brought an action against
the City of Seattle and the superintendent of buildings3 4 to review
properly included in a site plan . . . . Under most provisions, a building permit is
conditioned upon submission and approval of a site plan.
P. ROHAN, supra note 284, at § 55.05[1].
330. Board of Supervisors v. Medical Structures, Inc., 213 Va. 355, 357, 192 S.E.2d 799,
801 (1972).
331. 1 BOARD OF HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEv., Virginia UNIFORM STATEWIDE BUILDING
CODE § 109.1 (1984).
332. Id.
333. 90 Wash. 2d 59, 578 P.2d 1309 (1978).
334. From the context of the case a "superintendent of buildings" in Washington is
equivalent to a "building official" under Virginia's BOCA Code.
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a decision denying Polygon's application for a building permit. The
denial was based on the proposed building's adverse impact on the
environment. The superintendent of buildings found substantive
authority to deny application in the Local Building Code and State
Environmental Policy Act. The State Environmental Policy Act set
forth a state policy of protection, restoration, and enhancement of
the environment. At the same time, the Seattle Municipal Code
authorized the superintendent of buildings to issue building permits "'[i]f the superintendent of buildings is satisfied that the
work described in the application for permit and the plans filed
therewith conform to the requirements of. . .other pertinent laws
and ordinances.' "135 The State Environmental Policy Act coupled
with the Seattle Municipal Code led the building official to believe
that he could deny building permits if a project threatened environmental harm.
The Supreme Court of Washington agreed. The court noted that
its ruling was buttressed by a provision in the State Environmental
Protection Act providing that "'[t]he policies and goals set forth
in this Chapter are supplementary to those set forth in existing
authorizations of all branches of government of the state, including
• . .municipal. . .corporations.' -1336 The court concluded that the
State Environmental Protection Act covered the requirements
which existed prior to its adoption. Thus, the court expressly held
that the State Environmental Protection Act "confers on the city,
acting through its superintendent of buildings, the discretion to
deny a building permit application on the basis of adverse environ'' 337
mental impacts disclosed by an EIS.
Statutory authority substantially similar to Washington's
scheme is found in Virginia's CBPA and the BOCA Code. First,
Section 10.1-200 of the Code of Virginia clearly directs localities to
protect the Chesapeake Bay and its tributaries. Similarly, Section
10.1-2108 directs localities "to exercise their police and zoning
powers to protect the quality of state waters consistent with the
provisions of [the CBPA]." Further, Section 10.1-2113 clearly
states that the authorities granted within the CBPA are supplemental to other local government authority. Finally, the State
BOCA Code conveys the same discretion to Virginia building offi335. 90 Wash. 2d at

-,

578 P.2d at 1312-13, (quoting The Seattle Municipal Code

§ 3.03.020(e)).
336. Id. at

337. Id.

-,

578 P.2d at 1313.
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cials as the Washington BOCA Code."3 8 Consequently, it appears
that a building official could deny building permits for projects
which threaten environmental harm.
This analysis is not without its weakness. In Polygon, the building the official was able to base his determination of environmental
harm upon an environmental impact statement mandated by existing law. An environmental impact statement is not required
under similar circumstances in Virginia, and it may be difficult for
a building official to justify his or her determination of inconsistency with the CBPA. However, if a means of providing a building
official with adequate information is found, the Polygon decision
remains sound. Indeed, the CBLAB may be suited for providing
such information. It is well suited for evaluating the potential impact of shoreline development on water quality. If its comments
are substituted for the environmental impact statement, then Polygon might control.
Polygon Corporation also contended that the building official's
denial of the building permit constituted a de facto rezoning. The
Supreme Court of Washington disagreed, stating that:
We find no de facto rezone of the property since the permit denial
was not based on the intended multi-family use, but rather on the
environmental impacts of the particular plan submitted. The zoning
was not changed and Polygon was not deprived of the opportunity
to develop its property under the zoning within the parameter of the
allowable environmental rights. The EIS here involved even suggest
alternative configurations for a multi-family building with less adverse environmental impacts.
Since the permit denial was not a rezone, either in law or in fact,
the doctrines and rules which intend such action are not
339
applicable.
Thus, if a building official were to deny a building permit because
he or she found that the construction of any building in a certain
area would violate the CBPA, then it would arguably be a de facto
rezoning and thus illegal. This suggests that the decision should be
based upon a determination of actual impact as opposed to a determination based upon use. For example, if a zoning ordinance
338. 1 VIRGINIA UNIFORM STATEWIDE BUILDING
(1987).
339. 90 Wash. 2d at -, 578 P.2d at 1313.

CODE, NEW CONSTRUCTION CODE § 109.1
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currently allows residential units to be constructed in a flood plain,
a building official would not be authorized to prohibit residential
uses because he found them to be inconsistent with the CBPA.
Presumably, such decision would have to result through the zoning
amendment process. However, the building official could base his
decision upon inadequate buffers and other means to control runoff into the adjacent tributary of the Bay.
Finally, Polygon Corporation argued that if the State Environmental Policy Act is found to confer substantive authority, it is an
unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. The court disagreed with this argument noting that constitutional requirements
for such a delegation require that the legislature provide standards
defining what is to be done and what body is to accomplish it, as
well as procedural safeguards to control arbitrary administrative
action. As to the first requirement, the court found that the Act
defined the responsibilities of governmental entities, and further
noted that the EPA did not act in isolation, but rather was supplemented by an overlay of governmental authorization. "Thus, operative procedural safeguards can be found not only in SEPA, but in
the underlying statutes, ordinances, and practices of the agency
concerned. One such safeguard lies in the fact that Seattle's building permit application process provided ample opportunity for Polygon to present its views. 34 0 By analogy, Virginia courts should
uphold similar actions by Virginia building officials. Less clear is
whether the Act articulates adequate standards defining what is to
be done and what body is to accomplish it. The locality would
likely argue that the CBPA supplies sufficient standards by mandating a protection of state water quality and certain lands, which
if improperly developed, may result in substantial damage to the
water quality of the Bay and its tributaries. A Polygon analysis
also is premised upon the right to turn down a project as part of a
building permit review. In Medical Structures, the Supreme Court
of Virginia established a vesting date as the submission of a site
plan:
Under current planning practice in many urban localities, the site
plan has virtually replaced the building permit as the most vital
document in the development process .... The filing of such a
plan creates a monument to the developer's intention, and when the
plan is approved, the building permit, except in rare situations, will
340. Id. at

-,

578 P.2d at 1313-14.
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be issued.341
The court understandably discussed this in terms of what is, not
what must be. To overcome this, a locality simply must announce a
CBPA analysis as part of its building code review process, thereby
precluding the "automatic issuance" relied upon by the court.
This particular issue, however, may be a red herring. As discussed above, it is not for the building official to undertake a rezoning, but rather to protect the Bay and its tributaries through
police powers. It also should not matter when use rights vest in
order to enforce new health and safety performance standards. The
vitality of a Polygon analysis will not be known unless tried and
challenged. For those localities worried about the rush to vest, Polygon merits consideration.
2.

Regulation After Rights Vest

A major issue to be resolved is whether existing uses (including
those that win the vesting race) are immune from any CBPA regulation. Unfortunately, Virginia case law is inadequate to sufficiently predict the answer to this question. In the absence of controlling state precedent, the Arizona case of Watanabe v. City of
Phoenix3 42 may be influential.
At issue in Watanabe was whether a locality could use a zoning
ordinance to require an existing nonconforming use to change the
dust-proofing of its parking area from gravel to paving. 43 The
plaintiffs based their argument upon their interpretation of a
vested rights statute similar to Virginia's. 3 44 The plaintiffs argued
that a locality may not enforce any zoning ordinance which affects
their existing nonconforming property. 45 The Arizona Court of
341. Board of Supervisors v. Medical Structures, 213 Va. 355, 357-58, 192, S.E.2d 799, 801
(1972).
342. 140 Ariz. 575, 683 P.2d 1177 (1984).
343. Id. at -, 683 P.2d at 1179.
344. Nothing in an ordinance or regulation authorized by this article [municipal planning] shall affect existing property or the right to its continued use for the purpose
used at the time the ordinance or regulation takes effect, nor to any reasonable repairs or alterations in buildings or property used for such existing purposes.
ARz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9-462.01 (1977), quoted in Watanabe v. Phoenix, 140 Ariz. at
683 P.2d at 1179.
683 P.2d at 1179; see Witt, Vested Rights in Land Uses, in PLAN345. 140 Ariz. at -,
NING IN VIRGINIA 15 (Jan. 1988) ("[t]he concept of vested rights in land uses, involves the
question of when, if ever, does a landowner or developer acquire the immutable right to use
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Appeals rejected this contention as too broad:
The principle of nonconforming uses is based upon the injustice and
doubtful constitutionality of compelling immediate discontinuance
of the nonconforming use. While nonconforming uses existing at the
time zoning ordinance became effective cannot be prohibited, they
are subject to reasonable regulations under the police power to protect the public, health, safety, welfare, or morals. . . .However, cities cannot impose zoning restrictions
which make the nonconform34 6
ing use economically impossible.
The court went on to find a dust-control ordinance well within the
police powers of the locality and further found that the dust-control measures did not render the underlying nonconforming uses
impossible. Accordingly, the ordinance was upheld. By analogy,
Virginia localities may regulate existing users of land in Tidewater
Virginia, providing the regulations do not render the existing use
impossible. 4 7 The second prong of the takings test 8 s suggests that
such regulation could be extensive without violating the vested
rights of the landowner.
VII.

CONCLUSION

Governor Robb's Commission on Virginia's Future called upon
the General Assembly to convey authority to protect the environment to the localities. It did not "issue a call for concentration of
power in the agencies of our state government." Both of these results were obtained with passage of the CBPA. For the first time,
localities are given authority to protect a portion of the environment without limitation defined by the health and well-being of
their individual citizens. This protection will evolve through existing land use mechanisms; principally comprehensive plans, zoning ordinances, and subdivision ordinances.
This reliance upon existing laws and programs should bring a
reassuring level of certainty to this necessary effort to protect the
or develop land free from impairment by legislative action").
346. 140 Ariz. at -, 683 P.2d at 1179 (citations omitted).
347. See Foote, PLANNING AND ZONING IN VIRGINIA, HANDBOOK

307, 322 (1987).
348. See supra section VI A.
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Bay. Nevertheless, a number of legal issues will be pressed. This
article has suggested a few. Only time will tell how they are
resolved.

